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ABSTRACT 
Transnational technical standard-setting has grown in prominence in 
recent years. The World Trade Organization (WTO) requires the use of 
international standards but adopts a deferential approach towards 
international standards. However, practice shows that several international 
standards are promulgated through opaque and exclusionary processes. In 
line with this observation, in its recent US—Tuna II ruling, the Appellate 
Body adopted a more critical stance regarding international standards and 
the processes that lead to their adoption. Against this backdrop, this article 
focuses on an analysis of the properties and mechanics of international 
standard-setting processes within the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), discussing procedural and substantive guarantees 
regarding transparency, openness, deliberation and participation. As the 
WTO becomes the de facto arbiter of the legitimacy of international 
standards, much needed institutional reform in international standard-
setting is bound to occur. Arguably, this is bringing a paradigm shift in 
standardization practices and introduces “global standard-setting 2.0.” 
Such trend is in line with emerging demands for a more inclusive global legal 
order. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
International standards play an increasingly conspicuous role in WTO 
agreements.1 It is telling that the preamble of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT), one of the WTO-covered agreements,2 commences 
with the assumption that international standards improve efficiency of 
production and facilitate the conduct of international trade.3 Therefore, they 
should be adhered to for all practical purposes. The Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) includes statements along similar lines.4 
 
 1.  WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, at 9 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement or WTO Agreement]. 
 2.  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, annex 1A WTO Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 
U.N.T.S. 120, at 5  [hereinafter TBT]. 
 3.  Id.; see also Peter Swann et al., Standards and Trade Performance: the UK Experience, 106 
ECON. J. 1297, 1297–313 (1996). 
 4.  See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, annex 1A WTO 
Agreement, Ap. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, at 71–83 [hereinafter SPS]. 
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Standards are a form of codified technical knowledge that enables the 
development of products and processes. While voluntary, standards 
regularize and constrain behavior (regulative function), lend a taken-for-
granted quality to certain technologies and modi operandi (cognitive 
function), and favor cooperative strategies over adversarial ones (normative 
function).5 The last function in particular can have a long-lasting beneficial 
effect because standardization creates an infrastructure that, once created, 
gives parties an incentive to use it, resulting in increased cooperation and 
enabling users to take full advantage of the network effects of 
standardization.6 In addition, first mover advantages in standardization7 are 
substantial incentives for firms to innovate.8 Absent some form of standard-
setting, technological progress would miss an important instrument for 
benchmarking and capitalizing on advances in the field of technology. In that 
sense, standards are constitutive of markets9 and a decisive instrument for 
economic growth.10 
On the other hand, standards can also impede trade. This is because they 
reflect preferences and values of a given populace that may—and often do—
diverge, thereby inflating compliance costs for companies.11 If developed 
internationally, substantial gains can be made through the diminution of such 
costs and by addressing network externalities and information 
asymmetries.12 As a result, international standardization has become the 
preferred layer of regulatory action, both government and private driven.13 
 
 5.  Christel Lane, The Social Regulation of Inter-Firm Relations in Britain and Germany: Market 
Rules, Legal Norms and Technical Standards, 21 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 197, 197 (1997). 
 6.  Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 
93, 109 (1994).  
 7.  Art. 1.1 of the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004 [hereinafter The Guide] defines standardization as the 
“activity of establishing, with regard to actual or potential problems, provisions for common and repeated 
use, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context. Note 1: in particular, 
the activity consists of the processes of formulating, issuing, and implementing standards.”  
 8.  Again, and more generally, if we consider standardization as infrastructure, it can promote but 
also hamper innovation. See also Daron Acemoglu et al., Competing Engines of Growth: Innovation and 
Standardization, 147 J. ECON. THEORY 570, 573 (2012). 
 9.  Harm Schepel, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE – PRODUCT STANDARDS IN THE 
REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS (2005). 
 10.  Knut Blind & Andre Jungmittag, The Impact of Patents and Standards on Macroeconomic 
Growth: A Panel Approach Covering Four Countries and 12 Sectors, 29 J. PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 51, 
51 (2008). 
 11.  Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, International Trade, National Treatment and Domestic 
Regulation, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 152 (2011). 
 12.  See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005 at xxvi-xvii (2005). 
 13.  Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards – Technological Rationality or 
Primacy of Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1, 7 (2003); Kristina Tamm Hallström, ORGANIZING 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION – ISO AND THE IASC IN QUEST OF AUTHORITY (2004). 
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Globalization vindicates this choice; as the importance of global supply 
chains increases, international standards grow equally in prominence.14 
The cost of this seemingly irreversible shift of locus of standardization 
depends on the level of sophistication of the relevant firms. The consumer, 
on the other hand, is a net winner due to this development; economic theory 
would suggest that an international standard reduces consumer costs as 
information becomes more readily available and prices become more readily 
comparable.15 
The WTO, generally reluctant to use non-WTO material to assess the 
WTO compliance of a given Member,16 is more lenient when the output of 
international standard-setting bodies (ISSBs) is at stake. Much of previous 
WTO case law17 exemplifies this deferential approach. In both cases, non-
consensual international standards were considered relevant benchmarks for 
assessing WTO compatibility of national measures. This is quite 
extraordinary for a consensus-driven organization like the WTO, whereby 
the legacy of consensus is a major hallmark of the multilateral trading 
system. 
The texts of the SPS and TBT, respectively, only partially vindicate 
such unconditional deference to ISSBs. More recently, in US—Tuna II, the 
Appellate Body has given signs of a more critical approach vis-à-vis non-
WTO standards as relevant benchmarks for assessing compliance with WTO 
law.18 The Appellate Body ruled that no automatic and thus mechanical 
comparison should be made between the relevant international standard and 
the measure at issue in a WTO dispute. Rather, before this comparison takes 
place, an examination of the procedural and substantive guarantees of the 
standard-setter at issue is opportune if its output is to play a decisive role in 
finding a violation of WTO law. 
 
 14.  World Economic Forum (WEF), THE GLOBAL ENABLING TRADE REPORT 2012 – REDUCING 
SUPPLY CHAIN BARRIERS (2012). 
 15.  See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2012, 136 (2012). 
 16.  See Panagiotis Delimatsis, The Fragmentation of International Trade Law, 45 J. WORLD 
TRADE 87,102–03 (2011).  
 17.  See generally Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WTO Doc. WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) 
[hereinafter EC – Hormones]; Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of 
Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sep. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC – Sardines]. Nowadays, mention is 
exclusively made of the European Union and no longer of the European Community, as a result of the 
entry of the Treaty of Lisbon into force. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, 
art. 1(3), 7 June 2016 [hereinafter TEU]. 
 18.  See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (June 13, 2012) [hereinafter US – 
Tuna II].  
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This judicial finding points to the penumbra of processes used within 
ISSBs. Admittedly, our knowledge about the mechanics of international 
standard-setting is quite limited. Hearsay about lack of representation and 
inclusiveness is not uncommon, whereas anecdotal evidence about power 
politics and strategic behavior makes headlines from time to time. More 
recently, the shortcomings of international standardization processes became 
a central issue in the non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations 
within the WTO.19 
Against this backdrop, a closer analysis of the properties of 
international standard-setting is apposite and timely. Recognition of any rule 
presupposes contestation, which, in turn, inevitably inquires into how 
standards are adopted.20 Taking as an example the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO), the most important standard-setting body 
globally, this article analyzes the procedural and substantive guarantees 
regarding transparency, openness, deliberation, and participation within 
international standard-setting processes. This exercise aims to identify the 
processes that ensure that international standards adopted in these fora are in 
line with basic tenets of due process. 
A central argument of this article is that attributing automatic legal force 
in the WTO to international standards developed elsewhere is untenable. 
Such an approach is contrary to contemporary demands for more 
transparency and due process within global governance institutions 
generally, and openness in international standard-setting in particular.21 
More importantly, we deploy the analysis on ISO to submit that, in times of 
increased legalization of international rule-making at the transnational level, 
an examination of the necessary guarantees (or a “democratic minimum”)22 
with which an international standard-setter would need to comply is 
indispensable. 
At this juncture, the role and influence of the WTO as a potential driver 
for a new approach in international standard-setting, or “standard-setting 
 
 19.  See WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, ‘Market Access for Non-Agricultural 
Products – International Standards in Support of Trade and Economic Development: Strengthening the 
Contribution of the Committee Decision’, WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/141 (March 29, 2011) (referring to the 
TBT Committee Decision relating to the development of international standards, see infra, Section II). 
 20.  See Harm Schepel, Rules of Recognition: A Legal Constructivist Approach to Transnational 
Private Regulation, in REGULATORY HYBRIDIZATION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE 189, 197 (Paulius 
Jurčys et al. eds., 2013). 
 21.  See Armin von Bogdandy, The European Lesson for International Democracy: The 
Significance of Articles 9–12 EU Treaty for International Organizations, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315, 331 
(2012). 
 22.  See Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 
108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2014). 
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2.0,” will also form part of the analysis that the article offers. Section II 
describes the position of international standards in the TBT by reference to 
the current legal framework and case law, while Section III presents an 
account of ISO standard-setting processes. A critical assessment of standard-
setting practices within ISO follows in Section IV. 
II. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND THE TBT 
The multilateral trading system was initially based on a negative 
integration contractual approach; non-discrimination has been the 
overarching principle of the system and the linchpin of this approach, 
allowing sufficient leeway for domestic regulatory authorities to unilaterally 
define the set of policies they would want to adopt. Thus, international 
standards and, a fortiori, the bodies that promulgate them were outside the 
reach of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which meant 
that the international standardization regime and the multilateral trading 
regime would pave their own, distinct ways of exerting influence over 
commercial transactions.23 
The advent of the WTO would not change much with respect to the lack 
of any capacity of the trading system to create technical standards itself. 
However, the level of integration sought regarding non-tariff barriers would 
change, with greater emphasis on regulations of technical nature and 
measures purportedly taken to protect public health or safety.24 Both the TBT 
and the SPS would now clearly strive for regulatory convergence using 
international standards as benchmarks regarding the direction such 
convergence should take.25 Standards created in ISSBs, such as ISO, the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), or the Codex 
Alimentarius, were invariably regarded as authoritative expressions of 
international technical consensus. They could be used as proxies that would 
allow for properly striking the balance in any given case between 
protectionist-driven domestic regulations and the well-meant protection of 
non-economic, public policy objectives. Thus, non-WTO material—i.e., 
 
 23.  It is only in the Tokyo Round in the mid-70s that the issue of technical barriers to trade and the 
role that international standards could play was discussed, leading to a plurilateral agreement. See ALAN 
O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS, 57–77 (1995). 
 24.  See Jacqueline Peel, A GMO by Any Other Name . . . Might Be an SPS Risk!: Implications of 
Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
1008, 1013 (2007). 
 25.  See Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, The 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A 
Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811, 
886–93 (2002). 
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international standards—would play the role of useful heuristic devices in 
this new area of growing positive integration within the WTO. The absence 
of a standard-setting capacity by the TBT and SPS committees, or the WTO 
more generally, warranted the introduction of non-WTO material by 
reference. 
A. Technical Regulations and (International) Standards under the TBT 
The TBT distinguishes between two types of measures: technical 
regulations and standards.26 The difference between the two lies in the degree 
of compliance: whereas compliance is mandatory for technical regulations, 
it is only voluntary in the case of standards. Still, some overlap regarding the 
scope of the two categories is evident by reading the definitions in the TBT 
Agreement; they both cover labeling requirements and production and 
process methods (PPMs). An additional difference between technical 
regulations and standards relates to the source of the measure: whereas 
technical regulations would typically be adopted by a governmental body 
and thus be a State measure, standards are typically issued by private or semi-
private SSBs. Standards can later become technical regulations (or part 
thereof) if adopted or used as a basis for legislative acts by the State. 
In practice, the distinction between the two is not always 
straightforward and can confuse regulators, companies, and courts alike. 
Recently, in US—Tuna II, the WTO adjudicating bodies blurred the 
distinction between the two types of TBT measures by arguing that a 
voluntary dolphin-safe labeling scheme for tuna products access (which is 
subject to certain criteria as to how the tuna was harvested) is a technical 
regulation and not a standard, although access to the US market for tuna was 
available.27 
Article 2.4 of the TBT is the key provision when examining the relation 
between international standards and the TBT. Pursuant to this provision, 
relevant international standards or relevant parts thereof (when they exist or 
are about to be adopted) must be used as a basis for domestic technical 
regulations unless they are ineffective means for meeting the public policy 
objectives. International standards are used as a basis when they are the 
 
 26.  TBT, supra note 2, at annex 1. On the definition of technical regulation in annex 1.1, see 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing 
of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R & WTO Doc. WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014), ¶ 5.8ff 
[hereinafter EC – Seal Products]. 
 27.  See also Panagiotis Delimatsis, “Relevant International Standards” and “Recognized 
Standardisation Bodies” under the TBT Agreement, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDISATION 104, 119 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015). 
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principal constituent or fundamental principle for the purpose of enacting the 
technical regulation at stake. Furthermore, there is no restriction with respect 
to time. Hence, international standards created before the entry of the TBT 
into force can also be relevant if the state of the art has not changed in the 
meantime with the adoption of a new international standard.28 In other words, 
previously voluntary standards suddenly become mandatory benchmarks for 
domestic technical regulations.29 
Article 2.5 incorporates a presumption of TBT compatibility for those 
technical regulations that are in accordance with relevant international 
standards and pursue a legitimate objective. The rationale behind this “safe 
haven” is that voluntary international standards incorporate international 
preferences and constitute artifacts of widely accepted technical superiority. 
In addition, Article 2.9 imposes additional notification requirements in case 
relevant international standards are not used. 
Hence, the tilt toward the use of relevant international standards 
manifests in a variety of ways: first, a requirement that members use relevant 
international standards in a positive manner and the creation of a rebuttable 
presumption of consistency as an extra “carrot”; second, the imposition of 
additional burdensome conditions that members need to abide by if they 
disregard or decide not to use international standards. 
As a consequence of TBT’s unequivocal preference, then, in those areas 
where international standards exist, they become the reference point and de 
facto mandatory normative technical material to be used by WTO Members. 
As a result, a mass of documents of at best uncertain legal normativity is 
transformed into international obligations equivalent to treaty text.30 As 
noted earlier, this is even more striking if one considers the meticulous 
character of the analysis that the WTO adjudicating bodies typically 
undertake when attempting to classify particular legal texts under one of the 
subparagraphs of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT). 
For such an unambiguous endorsement of legal material generated 
outside the WTO, the TBT Agreement is quite cryptic with respect to what 
 
 28.  EC – Sardines, ¶ 205. 
 29.  This changed forever the way international standards, particularly those created within ISO, 
were perceived by States; ISSBs grew in salience, but also came under States’ and scholars’ spotlights, 
very quickly. See Winton Higgins & Kristina Tamm Hallström, Standardization, Globalization and 
Rationalities of Government, 14 ORGANIZATION 685, 696 (2007). 
 30.  See Robert Howse, A New Device for Creating International Legal Normativity: The WTO 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and “International Standards”, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 383, 384 (Christian Joerges 
& Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2011). 
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constitutes a relevant international standard.31 Only a generic definition of 
“standard” is available in the TBT: 
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and 
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related 
processes and production methods, with which compliance is not 
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a 
product, process or production method.32 
Importantly, the explanatory note that follows suggests that, whereas 
standards adopted by the “international standardization community” are 
based on consensus, the TBT also covers documents that are not based on 
consensus.33 
The definition of a standard in the ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 is,34 for all 
practical purposes, similar to the one in the TBT, albeit with important 
nuances: 
[D]ocument, established by consensus and approved by a recognized 
body, that provides for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of 
the optimum degree of order in a given context. Note: Standards should 
be based on the consolidated results of science, technology and 
experience, and aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits.35 
As one can infer, a crucial difference between the two definitions 
provided above is the role of consensus when considering whether a 
particular technical content could be deemed a standard. 
B. Standardizing Organizations and “Recognized” Bodies 
The Guide further considers as international those standards that are 
adopted by an international standardizing/standards organization and made 
 
 31.  The lack of a definition of what an international standard is may also be due to the fundamental 
disagreement between the EU and the US as to what an international standard and an international 
standard-setting body stand for. This same question lies at the heart of the negotiations for a Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). See CEN/CENELEC Position Paper on EU-US Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Technical Barriers to Trade, Initial EU Position Paper (Sept. 
2013). 
 32.  TBT, supra note 2, at 132 (emphasis added). 
 33.  Id. (“For the purpose of this Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and technical 
regulations as mandatory documents. Standards prepared by the international standardization community 
are based on consensus. This Agreement covers also documents that are not based on consensus.”) 
 34.  The Guide is an update of ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991 on which the TBT is based. See note 7. 
 35.  See The Guide, supra note 7, at 38 (emphasis added). 
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available to the public.36 In turn, an international standardizing organization 
is defined in the Guide as “the organization” (that is, the body that is based 
in the membership of other bodies or individuals and has an “established 
constitution and its own administration”) whose membership is open to the 
relevant national body from every country.37 The TBT defines international 
bodies in an open-ended manner: international body is the body or system 
whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of all WTO Members. In 
other words, when examining the international nature of a standard, attention 
should center on the traits of the institution promulgating it38 rather than the 
very content of the standard at issue.39 
Regarding the traits that such an institution should have, the TBT 
definition of standards refers to “recognized” standardization bodies. By the 
same token, Article 4.3 of the ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 defines as 
standardizing those bodies which have recognized activities in 
standardization.40 On the other hand, the TBT references a recognized 
standardization body. In US—Tuna II, the Appellate Body suggested that 
recognition is reserved for active standardization bodies and suggested that 
“the larger the number of countries that participate in the development of a 
standard, the more likely it can be said that the respective body’s activities 
in standardization are ‘recognized’.”41 
Thus, recognition within the meaning of Article 1.2 of the TBT would 
be a function of the degree of recognition by WTO Members (through 
participation), rather than the standardization community. The Appellate 
Body also noted that no quantitative benchmark should be in place with 
respect to standardization activities. It appears that, in this case, contextual 
analysis would be necessary to find that a given body has recognized 
activities on international standardization. For instance, evidence with 
respect to (a) the level of participation of WTO Members in the development 
of a given standard; (b) wide recognition of the validity and legality of even 
 
 36.  Echoed in Regulation 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oct. 
2012, on European Standardisation, art. 2(1)(a), 2012 O.J. (L 316/12) 19 [hereinafter EU Regulation 
1025/2012]. 
 37.  See The Guide, supra note 7, at 39–41. 
 38.  Compare the distinction between international, European, and national standards in the EU 
Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 36, at art. 2(1)(a), (b) and (d). 
 39.  See also Communication from Columbia, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Sixth 
Triennial Review of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: Standards, ¶8 ff, WTO Doc. 
G/TBT/W/351 (Mar. 21, 2012). 
 40.  In US – Tuna II, the Appellate Body found that the ISO definition of a standardizing body 
should assist in the interpretation of the TBT term ‘recognized body’. See US – Tuna II, supra note 18, 
at ¶362. 
 41.  US – Tuna II, supra note 18, at ¶390. 
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a single standard; and (c) adherence to the TBT Committee Decision of 2000 
on principles for the development of international standards (the “TBT 
Committee Decision”) would influence the decision as to whether certain 
standardization activities are “recognized.” 
For the first time in US—Tuna II, in a highly important jurisprudential 
turn, adherence to the TBT Committee Decision was linked to the issue of 
whether a given standard-setting body has recognized activities. In previous 
WTO disputes, international standards that were adopted with limited 
majority were considered as relevant international standards by the WTO 
adjudicating bodies for the purposes of Article 2.4 of the TBT. In EC—
Sardines, the relevant Codex Alimentarius standard was adopted by 18 
parties out of over 150 at that time.42 Similarly, in EC – Hormones, the GMO 
standard (an SPS standard, but still indicative of the trend within the WTO 
vis-à-vis international standards) was adopted with 33 votes against 29 and 
7 abstentions. Both standards were adopted before 1995, that is, in a period 
where the GATT did not use international standards as benchmarks for 
GATT consistency.43 Therefore, the interest for participating in the creation 
of essentially voluntary technical specifications at the international level was 
reduced. 
However, in the aftermath of the multilateral adoption of the TBT and 
SPS in 1995, higher levels of scrutiny of standard-setting practices were 
deemed to be warranted, and these disputes only served to alert WTO 
Members as to the possible challenges that an unqualified endorsement of 
standards adopted elsewhere would entail. Indeed, such jurisprudence, which 
in practice failed to take into account important controversies and debates in 
ISSBs, was sitting uncomfortably with the advocacy for more openness and 
better governance in global institutions.44 
As a result, in the year 2000, the TBT Committee agreed on six 
principles that should be observed by ISSBs when they develop international 
standards: transparency; openness; impartiality and consensus; effectiveness 
 
 42.  Panel Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 5, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002) [hereinafter EC – Sardines]. 
 43.  It should be noted here that the multilateral Tokyo Round Code on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(the ‘Standards Code’), included in its art. 2.2 a provision similar to art. 2.4 TBT. However, the Code was 
only binding to those GATT contracting parties subscribing to it, that is, 32 countries at the time. 
 44.  Having said this, this jurisprudence is perhaps indicative of the WTO’s reluctance to engage in 
a discussion as to the legality of standards developed within Codex Alimentarius. Controversy is still 
present as to the standard-setting practices of the Codex as exemplified by the recent Ractopamine case. 
See Alessandra Arcuri, The Coproduction of the Global Regulatory Regime for Food Safety Standards: 
the SPS, Codex and the Limits of Technocratic Ethos, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDISATION 79 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015). 
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and relevance; coherence; and addressing the concerns of the developing 
world (the so-called “development dimension”). This was a consensus-
driven signal by the WTO that rules and procedures in ISSBs had to be 
strengthened. Clearly, it was an external call for reform of international 
standard-setting activities.45 
C. Upgrading the TBT Committee Decision 
Although the WTO adjudicating bodies rejected the EU’s position in 
EC—Sardines and EC—Hormones regarding the relevance of the 
international standards at issue for assessing TBT compliance, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that much of the TBT Committee Decision of 2000 was 
driven by the U.S., which came to realize that the EU was unduly dominating 
the domain of international standardization.46 The legal value of the Decision 
quickly became a controversial topic. In EC—Sardines, the Panel found that 
the Decision was not binding, but a mere “policy statement of preference.”47 
Thus, the fact that the Codex standard at issue was not adopted by consensus 
was immaterial. However, the TBT Committee Decision had a substantial 
impact on standard-setting processes, particularly within ISO. Whereas ISO 
very early reacted positively to the TBT Committee Decision and alleged 
that it complied with the principles enshrined therein,48 it also intensified its 
work with respect to ensuring due process in standards development, 
accommodating more intensively the concerns of developing countries or 
broadening the circle of stakeholder participation. 
The Appellate Body was not called upon to review the Panel’s finding 
in EC—Sardines, but was given the opportunity to address the issue ten years 
later in US—Tuna II. Disagreeing with the Panel in EC—Sardines, the 
Appellate Body considered the TBT Committee Decision as a “subsequent 
agreement” within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) VCLT, which obliges any 
WTO treaty interpreter to read the Decision together with the text of the 
TBT. The Appellate Body was led to this conclusion based on various 
elements. The Decision was adopted by consensus; it bears specifically upon 
the interpretation and application of a TBT provision and constitutes a 
 
 45.  See WTO, TBT Committee, “Second Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation 
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, annex 4: Decision of the Committee on Principles for 
the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to art. 2, 5 and 
annex 3 of the Agreement,” G/TBT/9, Nov. 13, 2000. 
 46.  I would like to thank Amelia Porges for pointing out this part of the negotiating history to me. 
 47.  EC – Sardines, ¶7.91. 
 48.  See WTO, TBT Committee, “Developments within the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) that are related to the Second Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement,” 
Communication from ISO, G/TBT/W/158 (May 18, 2001). 
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testimony of Members’ expressed intention to: (a) develop a better 
understanding of international standards; (b) ensure the effective application 
of the TBT; and (c) clarify and strengthen the concept of international 
standards.49 
Indeed, agreements following the conclusion of a previous agreement 
aiming to specify how existing rules or obligations are to be applied (rather 
than to create new—or extend existing—obligations) can fall under Article 
31(3)(a) VCLT, constituting a further authentic element of interpretation to 
be taken into account along with context.50 However, considering the TBT 
Committee Decision as a “subsequent agreement” barely squares with the 
EC—Sardines previous finding that the last sentence of the Explanatory Note 
in Annex 1.2 TBT also relates to international standards. Then, if no 
consensus is required for a standard to be regarded as a “relevant 
international standard,” the TBT Committee Decision, by requiring 
consensus, amounts to an amendment of the TBT text, at least as far as 
international standards are concerned.51 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body 
failed to reach such a conclusion expressly. 
Still, based on these considerations, the Appellate Body found that an 
invitation-only regional standard-setting body (such as the Agreement on the 
International Dolphin Conservation Program-AIDCP, the relevant standard 
invoked by Mexico) is not open to all WTO Members.52 It also noted that, in 
more generalized terms, standardization bodies must be open and transparent 
at every stage of developing standards in line with the TBT Committee 
Decision. 
D. Interim Conclusion 
In sum, the TBT exerts a high level of deference towards technical 
rationality as expressed through international standard-setting activities 
outside the WTO. Standards developed within ISSBs acquire a prominent 
role at the WTO through the very text of Articles 2.4 and 2.5 of the TBT, 
which requires that WTO Members use “relevant international standards” 
and presume compliance with the TBT when such standards are used as a 
basis for domestic technical regulations. It is one thing to state that the TBT 
 
 49.  US – Tuna II, supra note 18, at ¶¶371-2. 
 50.  See Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (art. 21.5 – Ecuador II), ¶391; and Appellate 
Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, ¶265. 
 51.  Practice in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) would also suggest that Members by now view 
the TBT Committee Decision as the authoritative document for identifying what an international standard 
is. See, among many others, the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 8 (TBT), art. 8.4.2. 
 52.  However, the Appellate Body cautioned that such a body could still be considered as open if 
the invitation was a mere formality. See US – Tuna II, supra note 18, at ¶386. 
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Committee would be unable to develop any standards whatsoever. It is quite 
another to claim that certain non-WTO rules can vindicate WTO consistency 
as long as they are relevant to the product at issue in a WTO dispute 
regardless of the process that led to their adoption.53 
Quite astonishingly, the TBT entails such delegation of regulatory 
power54 without any inquiry into the actual processes used throughout the 
development of international technical standards. This is even more 
surprising if one considers that such regulatory outsourcing is directed 
towards private actors, thereby creating an alternative to formal international 
law.55 The US—Tuna II case appears to set the foundations for a shift towards 
a more critical approach that would take into account procedural and 
substantive safeguards within ISSBs when they develop and approve 
international standards. 
This only makes sense: ISO in its capacity as the largest purveyor of 
international standards inevitably draws normativity and authority from the 
users of its standards, that is, traders originating in WTO Members. In other 
words, the WTO is the ex post “legitimizer” of international standards by 
default as per Article 2.4 of the TBT, but it can potentially be an ex post 
arbiter of their legitimacy or a third-level authoritative monitoring and 
enforcement device for international standardization in general. 
For these reasons, surveying with a view to identifying such guarantees 
is important. In the next Section, we discuss the existing procedural and 
substantive guarantees in the ISO. 
III. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE SAFEGUARDS IN ISO 
For many decades, standardization has served a complementary 
function to traditional (domestic) command-and-control regulation.56 
Indeed, theory suggests that non-binding, or “soft,” norms such as standards 
serve a gap-filling function for “harder” forms of law.57 Modern States 
concede part of their powers to other actors which can act more effectively 
 
 53.  Recall that this process is totally out of the control of the WTO. 
 54.  For a similar observation under the SPS, see, Tim Büthe, The globalization of health and safety 
standards: delegation of regulatory authority in the SPS Agreement of 1994 establishing the World Trade 
Organization, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 220 (2008). 
 55.  Eyal Benvenisti, “Coalitions of the Willing” and the Evolution of Informal International Law, 
in COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: AVANTGARDE OR THREAT? 1 (Christian Calliess et al. eds., 2007).  
 56.  As Schepel puts it, “regulators count on [private standards], markets cannot function without 
them.” See Harm Schepel, Constituting Private Governance Regimes: Standards Bodies in American 
Law, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 161, 164 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 
2004). 
 57.  LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 119–120 (2004). 
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and swiftly mainly due to their expertise, focus, and smaller size. This allows 
non-state voices to be heard, whereas States reshuffle their regulatory 
behavior and supervisory role (for instance, by focusing on ex post control 
of a certain activity).58 The advantages of non-coercive, “soft” forms of 
regulation transform States into catalysts, coordinators, and supporters of 
certain activities at the national or transnational level.59 Notably, the 
development of global business leads to an unprecedented expansion of 
regulatory rules that have a variety of penholders that are typically closer to 
the regulated object.60 
Standardization is a quasi-legal form of self-regulation and, depending 
on the circumstances and the legal context at hand, it can be a form of co-
regulation, or else a (hybrid) public-private partnership.61 Some regional 
standardization bodies like the European Committee for Standardization 
(CEN) fall under the latter category.62 With regard to the EU in particular, it 
is by now generally accepted that much of the influence that the EU member 
States exercise within the ISSBs is attributed to the New Approach, first 
introduced in the mid-80s.63 This approach towards standardization created 
a sophisticated cooperative network on standards development at the EU 
level among national SSBs, the European Commission, companies, and the 
European SSBs. It also aligned the functioning of European standard-setters 
with ISSBs through the creation of mirror committees. This network 
essentially delegated the creation of all technology-related content to the 
European SSBs. The New Approach revolutionized the way trade was 
conducted at the EU level and beyond, but also the way that standard-setting 
at the EU level (CEN, CENELEC, ETSI) mirrored standard-setting at the 
international level (ISO, IEC, ITU).64 
 
 58.  JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57–62 (2006); see also HENDRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS 
COMPETITORS 20–21 (1994). 
 59.  KENNETH W. ABBOTT & DUNCAN SNIDAL, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards 
Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 57–59 (Walter Mattli 
& Ngaire Woods eds., 2009). 
 60.  See David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (2005). 
 61.  See NILS BRUNSSON, Organizations, Markets and Standardization, in A WORLD OF STANDARDS 
27–28 (Nils Brunsson & Bengt Jacobsson eds., 2000). 
 62.  THE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 37 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Horatia 
Muir Watt Elgar eds., 2009). 
 63.  Panagiotis Delimatsis, Standardization in Services – European Ambitions and Sectoral 
Realities, 4 EUR. L. REV. 513, 522 (2016). 
 64.  See SCHEPEL, supra note 9, at 104–107; see also European Commission Communication, A 
strategic vision for European standards: Moving forward to enhance and accelerate the sustainable 
growth of the European economy by 2020, at 17–19, COM (2011) 311 final (June 1, 2011). 
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This approach is consistent with the premises of technical rationality,65 
a kind of technocratic legitimacy or technocracy-based subsidiarity. It is 
considered as the result of low sovereignty costs for governments, all the 
more because standardization activities typically result in output of voluntary 
nature.66 Even so, it is indicative of the ever-increasing expansion of 
legitimate authority outside the State.67 However, under certain 
circumstances it may be worrisome if this type of soft law preempts hard 
forms of law, which may be justifiably more intrusive, seeking higher levels 
of protection.68 
As there are manifold technological approaches, an SSB offers a forum 
where competitors and competing vested interests can resolve conflicts and 
coordination problems.69 Due to its importance, substantial financial 
resources and efforts are invested in standardization fora.70 The increase of 
standards-related patent disputes and the emergence of industry-sponsored 
consortia (but also actions against anticompetitive practices) are indicative 
of the growing importance of standardization particularly in high-tech 
areas.71 In this regard, for innovation to occur, an active, resourceful 
participation in standardization activities is necessary. 
Notwithstanding the importance of technical rationality and technical 
strength in standardization activities, standardization can become a highly 
 
 65.  LUIS M. B. CABRAL & TOBIAS KRETSCHMER, Standards battles and public policy, in 
STANDARDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 329–31 (Shane Greenstein & Victor Stango eds., 2007); Thomas A. 
Loya & John Boli, Standarization in the World Polity: Technical Rationality over Power, in 
CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 
169–171 (John Boli & George M. Thomas eds., 1999). 
 66.  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORGANIZATION 421, 441 (2000). 
 67.  See generally David J. Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
261, 261 (2008). 
 68.  See NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, “Soft Law” in a “Hybrid” Organization: The International 
Organization for Standardization, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE – THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING 
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 263, 272–273 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
 69.  See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents, 123 J. POL. ECON. 547, 547–48 
(2015) (arguing that SSBs perform three functions: a discovery, standardization and a regulatory 
function). 
 70.  See Joseph Farrell & Timothy Simcoe, Choosing the Rules for Consensus Standardization, 43 
RAND J. ECON. 235, 236–38 (2012). See also the observation of the Advocate-General Campos Sanchez-
Bordona in the recent Elliott case before the CJEU that ‘[i]ndustry assumes the greater share of the costs 
of standardization. . .’. Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Limited v. Irish Asphalt Limited, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:63 (2016), ¶ 58. 
 71.  See Mark Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48 
B.C. L. REV. 149, 154 (2007); see also Pierre Larouche & Geertrui Van Overwalle, Interoperability 
standards, patents and competition policy, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDISATION 79 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015). 
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politicized process whereby economic interests along with the quest for 
dominance among state and non-state actors shape its functioning.72 The 
more important the stakes in standardization become, the fiercer the 
competition for increased influence in SSBs is.73 Evidence suggests that 
power politics and regulatory capture by the big States may be endemic to 
international standard-setting.74 
Standardization can also be captured by the industries involved, which 
exploit the presence of asymmetric information and organization.75 An 
additional variable in this respect is the perennial conflict of interest that is 
endemic in SSBs because those subject to the standards are also those that 
promulgate them. Industries organize themselves more efficiently than 
consumers and manage to capture standard-setting institutions. This can also 
be the result of structural bias:76 for instance, ISO is a mainly non-
governmental, industry-driven, international standard-setter. 
More recently established sustainability-centered SSBs such as the 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling 
(ISEAL) Alliance claim to be more inclusive.77 Yet, even in such bodies, full 
membership is reserved to those presumed to have the necessary technical 
expertise; that is, standard-setting organizations and accreditation bodies.78 
Consumer associations or NGOs are barely involved in the actual 
development of the standards, but may engage more at a later stage in the 
consultation process and shortly before the standard becomes final. The 
stakeholders involved in international standardization are of a hybrid nature 
 
 72.  See Jo Swinnen & Thijs Vandemoortele, Trade and the Political Economy of Standards, 11 
WORLD TRADE REV. 390, 391 (2012); Pablo Marquez, Standardization and Capture: The Rise of 
Standardization in International Industrial Regulation and Global Administrative Law, 7 GLOBAL JURIST 
1, 2 (2007). 
 73.  See Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 121 (1994). 
 74.  DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
REGIMES (2007); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PÉTER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000). 
 75.  In the case of accounting standards, see S.P. Kothari; Karthik Ramann & Douglas J. Skinner, 
Implications for GAAP from an analysis of positive research in accounting, 20 J. ACCT. ECON. 246, 251 
(2010).  
 76.  See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 7, 9 (2009). 
 77.  ISO considers all these relatively new standard-setters as developing purely “private” standards 
and thus acting outside the formal standardization system which ISO alone claims to represent. See ISO, 
International standards and “private standards,” 2009. 
 78.  See Allison Loconto & Eve Fouilleux, Politics of private regulation: ISEAL and the Shaping 
of Transnational Sustainability Governance, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 166, 176 (2014); see also, Nicolas 
Hachez & Jan Wouters, A Glimpse at the Democratic Legitimacy of Private Standards: Assessing the 
Public Accountability of GLOBAL G.A.P., 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 677, 695–96 (2011).  
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and, like self-regulators, have a conflict of interest inherent in their functions: 
they are there to serve the interests of their constituents but also the national 
interest.79 
Thus, without the necessary procedural guarantees in place, the 
beneficial effects of standardization can be undermined. If standardization 
cannot resist market power, it may ultimately increase barriers to innovation 
and market access. Therefore, mechanisms that maintain an adequate level 
of institutional sensitivity and accommodating structures to take into account 
important societal values and a multiplicity of interests are necessary.80 
A. ISO 
1. The (One-Sided) Objective of ISO 
ISO was the first general international standardizing body ever 
created.81 Its predecessor, the International Standards Association (ISA), a 
federation of the national standardizing associations, was mainly a club 
dominated by the continental European countries (the “metric bloc”). It 
evolved into a truly international body only after World War II.82 ISO is not 
an intergovernmental organization, which means that its output is deprived 
of any formal coercive force; rather, it is a network (or federation) of national 
SSBs, composed of both governmental and industry representatives. The 
ISO Secretariat is relatively small (137 full-time employees), serving a 
coordination function. 
The purpose and normative point of the ISO is to promote 
the development of international standards with a view to facilitating trade 
and to developing cooperation with respect to intellectual, scientific, 
 
 79.  See also, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501–81 (2012) (providing that “the 
representation of United States interests before any private international standards organization shall be 
carried out by the organization member.” The latter is defined as “the private person who holds 
membership in a private international standards organization.”). See 19 U.S.C. § 2543 (quoted in Harm 
Schepel, The Empire’s Drains: Sources of Legal Recognition of Private Standardization Under the TBT 
Agreement, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 397, 404 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2011)). 
 80.  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, International “Standards” and International 
Governance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 345, 349 (2001). 
 81.  IEC, the ISSB dealing with standard-setting in the fields of electrical and electronic 
engineering, was established about half a century before ISO, in 1906. When established, ISO largely 
mirrored IEC’s structure. Over the years, ISO and IEC became the twin organizations for international 
standard-setting, having a similar structure, common rules of procedure, joint technical committees and 
a common standardization grammar (the regularly revised ISO/IEC Directives, that is).  
 82.  CRAIG MURPHY & JOANNE YATES, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
STANDARDIZATION (ISO): GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS (2009); see also 
TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS – THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN 
THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011), 126 ff. 
DELIMATSIS FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018 7:57 PM 
2018] GLOBAL STANDARD-SETTING 2.0 291 
technological, and economic activity.83 Thus, collective action within ISO 
should be about enabling commerce to flourish. Therefore, its activity and 
overall assessment should be based on this normative point of collective 
action within ISO; that is, how to encourage market access for traders. 
As it is, ends and means within ISO are very much economic, trade-
oriented and in particular producer-oriented. This is to be expected, 
particularly when looking at the composition of national SSBs which are 
members of ISO but also the very essence of international technical standard-
setting: it is the producers who feed the demand for international standards 
to alleviate costs. Indeed, traders are the main, if not only, demanders of 
international technical standards with a view to expanding market access, 
facilitating the smooth functioning of global supply chains, increasing 
interoperability and decreasing compliance costs. Other considerations such 
as those relating to safety or consumer protection, for instance, would be 
accounted for within national SSBs or domestic public regulatory 
authorities. 
2. ISO Membership 
ISO currently comprises over 160 members, predominantly national 
standardization bodies, involved in the development of standards. These 
bodies are of a hybrid nature, but primarily composed of representatives from 
the private industry, whereas government staff experts act as members in the 
national bodies.84 Again, this varies depending on the country’s (centralized 
or decentralized) approach to technical standards. In the U.S., for instance, 
where ANSI is a private entity, ISO standards are regarded as standards 
adopted by and addressed to private parties.85 In Japan, on the other hand, it 
is the Japanese Industrial Standards Committee, an advisory council of the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, that represents the Japanese 
interests to ISO. While under the auspices of the government, JISC is in 
reality a multi-stakeholder body. 
Domestic structures influence the positioning of particular national 
interests within ISSBs. For instance, allegations that the EU dominates 
international standard-setting through its regional SSBs and a “block-voting” 
 
 83.  ISO Statutes, 17th ed. (2013), art. 2.1. 
 84.  See ISO, ISO Membership Manual, I-7 (2015), http://www.iso.org/iso/ 
iso_membership_manual.pdf (last accessed on Feb 19, 2017); see also, Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, 
Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 575, 587 (2008).  
 85.  See David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: private voluntary 
standards as swords and shields, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO 
139, 141 (Geert van Calster, Marie Denise Prévost eds., 2013). 
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approach within ISSBs have been common.86 However, it was found that this 
observation most likely does not hold, or at least not to the extent argued by 
non-EU countries.87 
For each country, ISO accepts only one member, which is also the 
representative of ISO in that country. ISO has three categories of members: 
subscriber, correspondent and full members (or member body). Full 
members can be either participating (P-member) or observing members (O-
member). Full membership means unrestricted rights in terms of standards 
development. Only full members can unconditionally participate and vote. 
However, full membership is highly unbalanced: some ISO members 
(ABENOR of Benin) only participate in one technical committee (TC), while 
other ISO members such as France, Germany or the United Kingdom 
participate in over 700 technical bodies, including TCs, subcommittees and 
working or ad hoc study groups.88 
The degree of participation in these bodies varies: in some, the ISO 
member will hold the secretariat, whereas in others it is an O-member. In 
2015, there were over 750 active secretariats. Germany, the U.S. and Japan 
appear to be sharing the lion’s share of the workload—but also, importantly, 
influence. Overall, Europe has traditionally been more active and this still is 
the case. By way of illustration, the European standard-setting bodies held 
about half of ISO’s active secretariats in 2015.89 
Such participatory rights are not extended to subscriber and 
correspondent members. Correspondent membership (currently enlisting 38 
national standards bodies) amounts to an observer status to ISO. 
Correspondent members can also sell and adopt ISO standards nationally. 
This category of members varies considerably as well, including countries 
in the process of becoming EU members (e.g., Albania) and over ten African 
countries. The least active category is subscriber membership (currently 
encompassing 5 national standards bodies), whereby the national 
 
 86.  See ANSI, NATIONAL STANDARDS STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES (2000). 
 87.  See Jan Martin White, A “Single European Voice in International Standardization? American 
Perceptions, European Realities, Am. Inst. for Contemp. Ger. Stud. AICGS/DAAD Working Paper 
Series, 2003. 
 88.  Interestingly, six out of the ten most active member bodies stem from the European Union. In 
addition, and to show the breadth of activities that ISO maintains, there were over 3,500 active technical 
bodies within ISO in 2015. 
 89.  See ISO Figures, 2015. Interestingly, eight out of the twenty current ISO Council members are 
European standard-setters, representing countries of the European Economic Area (EEA). The ISO 
Council is the highest governance body of ISO, appointing, inter alia, the fifteen members of the 
Technical Management Board (TMB). Out of the eight national standard-setting bodies that participate 
in both the TMB and the ISO Council, three are European (Germany-DIN, France-AFNOR, and UK-
BSI). For the potential impact of the ISO-CEN Vienna Agreement, see infra under Section IV.B. 
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representative standard-setter cannot participate in standard-setting within 
ISO. In addition, such bodies cannot sell or adopt ISO standards at the 
domestic level. 
Recently, ISO decided to expand members’ rights for the last two 
categories of membership for the years 2014−19.90 This decision exemplified 
ISO’s attempt to allow for the less involved members to become acquainted 
with standards development processes, but also address concerns that were 
voiced with regard to lack of effective participation possibilities for 
developing countries, only for that time period, and without any additional 
charge, correspondent and subscriber members will be able to participate in 
up to five TCs; comment and vote on draft and final draft ISO standards 
prepared in these TCs in which they participate; as well as benefit from the 
ISO’s “twinning” system through partnerships with P-Members. However, 
they will be unable to have any committee leadership roles, which, in any 
case, necessitate considerable savvy. 
From the manner that this experimental scheme is structured, one can 
infer that ISO would expect these members to be actively involved. For 
instance, if they decide to take advantage of the new rights, they must 
participate in the TCs as P-members. O-membership is not permitted under 
this new scheme. This would mean, for instance, that at the end of the 
standards development process those members are obliged to vote (and thus 
take an informed stance) on draft standards. 
In view of the high preparation costs for such a transition, the possibility 
of participating in the twinning scheme sounds more promising for the least 
emancipated ISO Members. The rationale behind the twinning system is that 
developing countries face many difficulties in playing a leadership role 
within ISO. Through partnerships with developed countries, a beneficial 
knowledge transfer will most likely take place.91 An example of a rather 
successful twinning is the ISO 26000 on social responsibility, whereby 
Brazil (Chair) teamed up with Sweden (Vice-Chair) to lead the Working 
Group that was created. 
 
 90.  See OECD/ISO, International Regulatory Co-operation and International Organizations: The 
Case of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), OECD (2016), at 23.  
 91.  ISO, Guidance on Twinning in ISO Standards Development Activities: Increasing the 
Participation of Developing Country Members, ISO (April 2013). There are four types of twinning: 
between P-members; between convenors and co-convenors; between chairs and vice-chairs; and between 
secretaries and co-secretaries. The most recent version of the Guidance document was released in 
February 2017. 
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B. Standard-Setting Process in ISO 
1. The Understated Political Element of ISO Standard-Setting 
Standard-setting resembles law-making. Standards, like laws, are the 
outcome of discussion, bargaining, deliberation and compromise.92 
However, standards established by ISSBs like ISO are not law per se, but 
rather serve a clear regulatory function prescribing rules for others to 
follow.93 The standard-setting process within ISO—and, indeed, all ISSBs—
is a comprehensive regulatory function that not only sets the ends to be 
achieved through a particular international standard or “deliverable” but also 
is eloquent as to the means (technical for the most part) that should be used. 
In other words, not everything about international standardization is 
technical; rather, international standardization has a political and technical 
dimension alike: the political process determines the ends to be pursued by 
materials, products, services, and processes, whereas the technical 
dimension relates to the means that are most appropriate to achieve an end.94 
While it would be reductive to suggest that all ISO members stand on equal 
footing as to the technical part of the standardization process, it would be 
equally reductive to purport that the characteristics of the political process 
within ISO and the discussion (or lack thereof) of the ends pursued by a 
particular standard do not affect the authority of such standard and, 
ultimately, the authoritative collective action of ISO as a whole.95 
2. The Various Stages of Standard-Setting within ISO 
ISO standards are prepared within TCs. However, requests for the 
development of a given standard can originate in one or more national 
member bodies, a TC, a policy development committee such as DEVCO, the 
ISO Secretary-General, or even an organization outside ISO (for instance, 
another international organization). Development of a given standard is 
typically regarded as a stand-alone project that should be terminated in a 
 
 92.  See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15 (2005). 
 93.  See Julia Black, Legitimacy, accountability and polycentric regulation: dilemmas, trilemmas 
and organisational response, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 241, 246 (Anne Peters et 
al. eds., 2009). 
 94.  See Efficiency and Accountability in European Standardization Under the New Approach, 
Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (1998) 291 final (May 
13, 1998) at para. 7. 
 95.  For a more thorough analysis of this particular argument, see Hans Lindahl, ISO Standards and 
Authoritative Collective Action: Conceptual and Normative Issues, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL. STANDARDISATION 42 (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015). 
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reasonable period of time.96 Standards can be developed in a new TC or in 
an existing one. 
TCs are established by the ISO’s technical management board (TMB).97 
The TMB has fifteen member bodies appointed or elected by the ISO 
Council and is chaired by one of the ISO Vice-presidents.98 The TMB is in 
charge of managing the TCs. Consensus is desirable pursuant to the TMB 
Working Procedures, but a minimum of two-thirds majority vote may be 
sufficient. In the case of a tie, it is the TMB chair who decides.99 The TMB 
has a decisive role to play in deciding on the approval or not of project 
proposals relating to the future development of new standards and the 
allocation of work to TCs. In exercising its functions, the TMB can conduct 
informal exploratory enquiries to review the dynamics of a new potential 
project. The TMB will establish new TCs only if a two-thirds majority of the 
national bodies voting are in favor and at least 5 national member bodies 
have pledged to participate actively in the work of the TC.100 Every TC will 
normally have a Secretary and a Chairman. Secretariats are allocated by the 
TMB. 
Because of the rather decentralized form of ISO, the Secretariat of a TC 
will be run by an ISO member body (for instance, the Association française 
de normalisation-AFNOR or the American National Standards Institute-
ANSI), which will appoint a Secretary and nominate a Chairman.101 This 
solution was initially opted for to bridge the gap between those national SSBs 
which wanted ISO to have a coordinating role and those who saw ISO as a 
powerful international standard-setter.102 In theory at least, the TC 
 
 96.  See ISO/IEC Directives Part 1, Consolidated ISO Supplement – Procedures specific to ISO, 
7th edition, ISO (2016), art. 2.1 ff [hereinafter ISO/IEC Directives]. 
 97.  Id., at 1.9.1. 
 98.  See ISO Statutes, 17th edition (2013), art. 9. Current TMB members are (dates of term expiry 
included): ABNT (Brazil-2017); AFNOR (France-2017); ANSI (USA-2018); BSI (United Kingdom-
2018); DIN (Germany-2018); DSM (Malaysia-2017); GOST R (Russia-2018); JISC (Japan-2019); KATS 
(Korea-2018); SA (Australia-2019); SABS (South Africa-2017); SAC (China-2017); SIS (Sweden-
2017); SFS (Finland-2017); and SNV (Switzerland-2019). 
 99.  TMB Working Procedures, February 2014, art. 4.2ff. 
 100.  Thus, the voluntary character of international standards does not only relate to compliance with 
the final standard, but also to active participation in the development of such a standard. 
 101.  Crucially, this important task can be further delegated to private parties. For instance, ANSI 
has procedures in place that allow the delegation to private parties of ANSI participation to ISO. See 
ANSI, ANSI Procedures for U.S. Participation in the International Standards Activities of ISO – annex 
B: Criteria for the Development and Coordination of U.S. Positions in the International Standardization 
Activities of the ISO and IEC, January 2017. 
 102.  MURPHY & YATES, supra note 82, at 36. 
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Secretariat is bound to act in a purely international capacity rather than 
serving the national point of view.103 
Depending on the breadth of the workload, sub-committees or working 
groups may be created. Working groups are quite important and becoming a 
convener in those groups may influence the structure, content and form of 
the final standard. According to the ISO/IEC Directives (hereinafter “the 
Directives”), the convener will normally be the project leader and will ensure 
that, in a given period of time, a draft standard will be available for the sub-
committee’s and/or the parent TC’s consideration. 
There are over 230 active TCs within ISO.104 As the work of a given 
TC is very technical, having a bird’s-eye view of developments in each and 
every TC is very difficult, if not highly unlikely. Typically, national SSBs 
are called upon to act as secretariats in technical committees. Secretariats are 
distributed unevenly, with ANSI and DIN (Deutsches Institut für Normung, 
ANSI’s German counterpart) maintaining a disproportionally large number 
of such secretariats.105 By way of illustration, the German and American 
SSBs together account for almost forty percent of the active TC secretariats 
and convenerships.106 
There are seven “project stages” that show the development of the 
technical work within a TC. 
Table 1. The Stages of Standards Development within ISO 
 
 103.  See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at art. 1.9.2. 
 104.  A list of TCs can be found online: at http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development/ 
list_of_iso_technical_committees.htm (last accessed on Feb. 2, 2017). 
 105.  For the current figures, see ISO in figures 2015, online: http://www.iso.org/iso/ 
iso_figures_2015.xls (last accessed on Feb. 2, 2017). 
 106.  Id. 
Project stage Associated document 
Name Abbreviation 
Preliminary 
stage 
Preliminary work item PWI 
Proposal stage New work item proposala NP 
Preparatory stage Working draft(s)a WD 
Committee stage Committee draft(s)a CD 
Enquiry stage Enquiry draftb ISO/DIS 
IEC/CDV 
Approval stage final draft International 
Standardc 
FDIS 
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Preliminary work items are introduced by simple majority of the P-
members.107 This can then develop into a new work item proposal which will 
be approved provided that a simple majority of the P-members in the TC 
agree and at least 4 P-members commit to actively contribute to the project 
(in TCs with over 17 P-Members, at least 5 P-members should make a 
commitment to this respect). 
In the preparatory stage, a work draft will be prepared. In this respect, 
the creation of a working group and the appointment of a convener may be 
necessary. Once a Committee draft is ready, national member bodies of the 
TC (both P- and O-Members) have the opportunity to submit comments, and 
consensus building on the technical content is sought. Comments should be 
compiled and the TC secretariat is responsible for indicating the action taken 
on each of the comments received. Successive drafts will be discussed in this 
respect until consensus among the P-members of the TC is achieved.108 Once 
agreement is reached on the technical issues, an enquiry draft is circulated. 
At the enquiry stage, the draft standard is circulated to all national 
bodies for a 3-month vote. Importantly, this is the first time that ISO 
members that do not participate in the relevant TC will see the draft standard. 
Votes can be positive or negative—or ISO Members can inform of their 
abstention. Positive or negative votes can be accompanied by technical 
comments (or technical objections, respectively). A two-thirds majority of 
the P-member votes of the TC and the presence of no more than 25% of 
negative votes of all ISO members leads to the approval of the enquiry draft. 
In practice, approval of at least 75% of the national bodies casting a vote is 
striven for. Crucially, negative votes not accompanied by technical reasons 
do not count. 
This means that, in theory at least, a standard could pass this stage even 
in the—admittedly extreme, but still theoretically possible—case of 
abstention by all ISO members who are not participating in the relevant TC 
or in the presence of negative votes which raise non-technical concerns. This 
highlights the weight of P-Members’ behavior participating in the TC, but 
 
 107.  See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at art. 2.2.1. 
 108.  As discussed infra section III.C, consensus within ISO does not imply unanimity, but rather 
“absence of sustained opposition.” 
Publication stage International Standard ISO, IEC or ISO/IEC 
a These stages may be omitted. 
b Draft International Standard in ISO, committee draft for vote in IEC. 
c May be omitted. 
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also undermines the importance of the political element in the technical 
standard-setting process.109 
If no negative votes were received,110 the TC can proceed to the 
publication of the final standard. In case the above-mentioned criteria are not 
met, the TC prepares a final text after incorporating the new comments and 
suggestions received. This final draft international standard (DIS) will be 
circulated to national member bodies for approval (approval stage). The 
same criteria for approval apply at this stage with the only difference that 
comments are no longer accepted in case of a positive vote. Negative votes 
must again state the technical reasons for rejecting the final draft. Otherwise, 
they do not count. If the criteria (2/3 majority of P-Members of the TC and 
no more than 25% of negative votes cast) are not met, the draft standard shall 
be referred back to the TC. In this case, the TC can even cancel the entire 
project or resubmit a modified draft which will undergo all previous stages. 
Alternatively, the TC may decide to publish the draft standard as a 
technical specification, particularly in a case of persistent opposition or 
doubt as to consensus. In practice, this may happen only in cases of receiving 
negative votes that state technical objections and exceed the 25% benchmark 
of the total votes cast. A technical specification shall not be in conflict with 
an existing international standard. Later on (typically every three years), it 
can be reviewed with a view to being adopted as an international standard, 
provided that the criteria are met. 
Finally, in terms of deadlines, three different tracks for the development 
of standards are possible: 1) the accelerated standards development track (24 
months); 2) the default standards development track (36 months); and 3) the 
enlarged standards development track (48 months). The time runs from the 
date of adoption as an approved work item.111 In practice, standards 
development can last much longer, notably in cases of controversy. 
A fast-track procedure is envisaged in the Directives,112 for instance, in 
cases of a standard developed in another ISSB that is recognized by the ISO 
or IEC Council. If the fast-track procedure is opted for, then the document 
can be submitted directly for vote as a draft international standard to the ISO 
members through the relevant TC or subcommittees (SC) (enquiry stage). 
That document can be submitted directly as a final draft international 
 
 109.  See discussion supra section III.B.1. 
 110.  Abstentions and negative votes do not count unless they raise technical objections. ISO/IEC 
Directives, supra note 96, at art. 2.6.3. 
 111.  Id., art. 2.1.6.1. 
 112.  Id., annex F(2). 
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standard if the external ISSB is recognized by the ISO Council (approval 
stage).113 
The fast-track procedure can in theory reduce the time needed for a 
standard to be adopted, but it can also lead to certain frictions in situations 
where a competing standard is discussed at the same time within the ISO 
“ordinary” standard-setting process. For instance, something similar 
happened in the process that led to the adoption of Microsoft’s Office Open 
XML (OOXML) as an ISO standard (ISO/IEC 29500), overriding the effort 
of the proponents of Open Document Format (ODF) within ISO.114 In this 
respect, Microsoft was accused of attempting to circumvent the rules by first 
lobbying for the adoption of OOXML within Ecma International and then 
initiating the fast-track procedure taking advantage of the fact that Ecma 
International was an external Category A liaison body of the ISO/IEC JTC 
1.115 
3. Collaborative International Standard-Setting 
ISO works in close collaboration with the IEC on all matters relating to 
electrotechnical standardization. While ISO and the IEC share the same set 
of directives, there are also directives which are specific to ISO or the IEC. 
In 1987, the first Joint Technical Committee (JTC 1) was created between 
ISO and IEC to prepare standards in the areas of ICT, including multimedia, 
ICT security, and cloud computing.116 Along with ISO and IEC, a third 
important standardization body is the ITU. 
These three organizations are recognized as the only international 
standardization bodies in the field of technical standards for certain WTO 
Members, such as the EU.117 In 2001, ISO, IEC, and ITU established the 
World Standards Cooperation (WSC) with the goal of “strengthening and 
advancing the voluntary consensus-based International Standards 
system,”118 which they created through the avoidance of duplication and 
 
 113.  ISO/IEC Directives, supra note96, at F.2.1.2. 
 114.  See also Maija Palmer, Microsoft wins key ISO certification, FIN. TIMES (April 1, 2008), at 
https://www.ft.com/content/055e5bd0-0014-11dd-825a-000077b07658?mhq5j=e6 [https://perma.cc/ 
GU9L-GBVF] 
 115.  Note that the JTC 1 has its own procedures for fast-track standard-setting and appeals. Notably 
with respect to appeals, within JTC 1, not only P-members but any member/national body can appeal 
against an action or inaction. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at art. 5.1.2. 
 116.  See ISO/IEC JTC 1—INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, (last accessed on Feb. 15, 2017) at 
https://www.iso.org/isoiec-jtc-1.html [https://perma.cc/7SWA-CDAX]. 
 117.  See also EU Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 36, at art. 2 (9). 
 118.  ABOUT, (last accessed on Feb. 15, 2017) at http://www.worldstandardscooperation.org/ 
about.html [https://perma.cc/V6AE-L38D]. 
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overlap of work. The three ISSBs also cooperate in the area of patent policy 
by adhering to common guidelines.119 
C. Consensus Building in ISO 
Generally, ISSBs choose consensus as the decision-making mode par 
excellence, which ISO defines as “general agreement, characterized by the 
absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part 
of the concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into 
account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting 
arguments.”120 (Emphasis added). However, it is made clear that consensus 
need not imply unanimity. In addition, the Directives consider sustained 
oppositions as a peculiar category of objection. They are defined as 
“views…maintained by an important part of the concerned interest and 
which are incompatible with the committee consensus.”121 
The Directives call upon the leadership of the relevant body to solve the 
issue based on certain guidelines. For example, they require that the 
leadership of the committee ensure that the opposition is sustained by an 
important part of the concerned interest, which will vary depending on the 
dynamics of the relevant committee. If so, it should be dealt with in good 
faith. The right of opposing views to be heard is guaranteed in the Directives. 
However, and crucially, a sustained opposition is not akin to a right to veto. 
Thus, good-faith efforts are warranted, but progress of the committee work 
is not conditional on actual resolution of the issue. 
Although unanimity is not required, most international organizations 
aim for consensus building and have those mechanisms in place in their 
constitutions and by-laws.122 However, consensus can cause delays, whereby 
competitors argue for their preferred solution or simply hold out until one 
side concedes or withdraws to the benefit of the other.123 Endorsement of a 
given standard at the end of the process can generate substantial rents, 
making the effort worthwhile124 but also confirming the value of the 
 
 119.  See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at annex I.1. 
 120.  Id. at art. 2.5.6. This definition is generally accepted as reflecting the current understanding of 
consensus in SSBs. See also EU Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 36, at annex II, ¶ 3(b).  
 121.  See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at art. 2.5.6. 
 122.  See Jens Steffek, Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State: A View from International Relations, 
in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 81, 94 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004). 
 123.  Farrell and Saloner first described this tactic as a ‘war of attrition’, suggesting that it may lead 
to the technically best solution, but with a significant delay. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 
Coordination through committees and markets, 19 RAND J. ECON. 235, 238 (1988). 
 124.  Marc Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1920, 1924 (2008). 
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standard-setter as a stabilizing factor in its capacity as a coordinating 
authority. 
In addition, it was shown that, in areas of rapid technological innovation 
with important rents at stake (distributional conflicts), the standard-setting 
process may be slower in a consensus-based standard-setting body, but 
delays are efficient when the underlying technology improves over time. 
Therefore, and quite importantly, at the end of the lengthy process it is likely 
that higher quality outcomes will be produced.125 This means that, contrary 
to conventional belief, and somehow counterintuitively, striving for 
consensus may have a very limited impact on the technical and scientific 
excellence of a given standard. However, when vested interests are strong, 
relaxing the consensus requirement or identifying a neutral participant to 
break the deadlock (i.e., binding arbitration or appeal mechanisms) may be 
preferable to increase the effectiveness of a given standard.126 
In practice and as explained earlier, ISO does not decide by unanimity 
or even consensus, but rather has adopted qualified majority voting rules in 
the various stages (from the preliminary stage to the enquiry draft and up to 
the publication stage) that lead to the adoption of an international standard.127 
According to the Directives, within ISO, if there is doubt as to whether 
consensus was reached for registration as an enquiry draft (that is, the TC 
draft), a two-thirds majority of the actively involved members (“P-
members”) in the TC approving it would suffice.128 
The “two-thirds rule” of the active members and the 75% of votes cast 
seem to be generally applicable. Thus, rather than unanimity, these qualified 
majority voting modalities should be regarded as the general benchmark 
expressing the multilateral scientific consensus in the international technical 
standardization community. In line with this observation, a final draft 
international standard circulated by a TC is approved if two-thirds of the 
votes cast by the P-members in the TC (rather than of the entire ISO 
membership) are in favor and not more than one quarter of the total number 
of votes of national member bodies cast are negative. The two conditions are 
cumulative. Abstentions do not count and the same goes for negative votes 
that are not based on technical reasons.129 This applies to both the enquiry 
stage and the approval stage. This means that objections with respect to 
procedural defects, for instance, would need to be raised at an early stage 
 
 125.  Timothy Simcoe, Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared Technology 
Platforms, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 305, 331 (2012). 
 126.  Farrell & Simcoe, supra note 70, at 246.  
 127.  See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at cl. 2. 
 128. Id. at cl. 2.5.6. 
 129. Id. at cl. 2.7.3.  
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(i.e., at the moment that the relevant TC or subcommittee still discusses 
drafting). This is also made clear in the Directives of 2015, which provide 
the following: 
…to avoid re-discussion, national bodies have the responsibility of 
ensuring that their technical standpoint is established taking account of all 
interests concerned at national level, and that this standpoint is made clear 
at an early stage of the work rather than, for example, at the final 
(approval) stage. Moreover, national bodies need to recognize that 
substantial comments tabled at meetings are counter-productive, since no 
opportunity is available for other delegations to carry out the necessary 
consultations at home, without which rapid achievement of consensus will 
be difficult.130 
However, for this to be possible in the first place, effective participation is a 
prerequisite. Effective participation would include the ability to be at all 
meetings, to follow several meetings simultaneously, which may be 
organized in different places around the world, and to find the way through 
a large number of technical documents in a short period of time. 
D. Other Procedural and Substantive Guarantees 
   The Directives incorporate expressis verbis a right to appeal against 
decisions on new work items, committee drafts, enquiry drafts, or final draft 
international standards within 3 months from the decision at issue. However, 
and quite crucially, this right to appeal is not unqualified; rather, it is reserved 
exclusively for P-Members. The TMB is in charge of considering such 
appeals. Appeals can be filed by P-Members only on condition that they are 
against the Statutes and Rules of Procedure or the Directives, or detrimental 
to trade, safety, health or the environment. Appeals can relate not only to 
technical but also to administrative issues. However, they do not have 
suspensive effect, as the standards development can continue up to and 
including the approval stage.131 
In addition, appeals against new work items, committee drafts, enquiry 
drafts, or final draft international standards are accepted only if they relate 
to technical matters or the reputation of ISO is at stake.132 When it comes to 
issues that must be answered in the negative or the affirmative, approval by 
the TMB requires that at least two-thirds of the total votes be positive.133 
 
 130. Id. at 5 (emphasis added) 
 131. Id. at cl. 5.5. 
 132. See id. at cl. 5.1.3 (suggesting in the provision that the appeal should relate to a ‘question of 
principle.’ A teleological/contextual interpretation, for instance, the privileged rights of P-members or 
the fact that negative votes do not count unless they are based on technical reasons, would suggest that 
this equates to technical reasons). Id. 
 133. See TMB Working Procedures, supra note 99, at cl. 4. 
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Abstentions within the TMB are generally discouraged. If the TMB is in 
favor of moving forward with the appeal, a conciliation panel is established. 
The panel should resolve the dispute within a maximum of 6 months or refer 
the issue back to the TMB with its recommendations as to how the issue 
should be settled. The decision by the TMB can be appealed before the ISO 
Council Board. The decision by the latter on any appeal should be delivered 
within 3 months and is final. 
Furthermore, the Directives provide for a fairly detailed procedure that 
should precede the establishment of a new TC or the adoption of a new work 
item notably focusing on adducing evidence to substantiate the necessity 
thereof. The onus in this case lies with the proposer, particularly in 
establishing a substantial case about the “market relevance of the 
proposal.”134 Obviously, the level of detail in such proposals will vary, 
depending on the availability of technical knowledge and the existence of 
work previously conducted within ISO or elsewhere. Annex C of the 
Directives includes various procedural and substantive guarantees relating to 
the introduction of new work items (specificity of the proposed item; relation 
to and impact on existing standards or work items; an indication of possible 
participating countries; an indication of stakeholders and so on) that aim to 
ensure the viability of the new work item and spell out the need for, as well 
as the global relevance of, a new standard in a particular area. The Directives 
provide a list of documents that can be submitted such as statements 
explaining the technological, economic, societal, and environmental benefits 
of a proposed standard.135 However, the proposer is not bound by this list; 
rather, the proposer shall make first and foremost a substantial business case 
for the market relevance and need for a given proposed standard. 
In its continuous attempt to maintain its relevance, ISO has established 
two policy committees to inform its standardization work. 
First, the ISO Committee on developing country matters (DEVCO) was 
created in 1961. DEVCO currently has 101 participating and 52 observing 
member bodies and meets annually. DEVCO also monitors the ISO Action 
Plan for developing countries.136 In accordance with ISO’s practice, P-
Members have the upper hand in the discussions and actions, whereas many 
African countries but also other developing and least developed countries, 
having the status of correspondent members within ISO, can only participate 
as observers (O-members) and thus have no meaningful say. These countries 
 
 134.  ISO/IEC Directives, supra note96, at annex C, C.3.2. 
 135. Id. annex C, C.4.13.3. 
 136. See Int’l Org. for Standardization [ISO], Action Plan for Developing Countries 2016-2020, at 3 
(2016). 
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cannot participate, nominate experts, nor be in a chair’s group within the 
DEVCO. 
Second, the ISO Committee on Consumer Policy (COPOLCO) was 
created in 1978 and currently has 68 participating and 56 observing member 
bodies. To date, COPOLCO has published 7 standards (mostly guides on 
how to take into account consumer issues when developing standards) under 
its direct responsibility (including updates of previous editions of guides). 
Direct links with consumers at the national level are rather weak or, for 
certain countries, non-existent. ISO, however, expects that consumer 
interests are taken into account at the level of the national standards body.137 
When consumer-related issues are important elements of the development of 
an international standard, national standards bodies should consider 
including consumer representatives in their delegation.138 It seems that the 
involvement of consumers and consumer associations at the domestic level 
is a function of the sophistication of the national standards body.139 Be that 
as it may, COPOLCO is currently a committee where only ISO Members, 
that is, national standard-setting bodies, and no consumer associations are 
represented. 
Furthermore, the Directives provide for the regular review of 
international standards that should take place every 5 years at the latest. The 
review should not last more than 5 months and ends with a decision by the 
relevant committee to revise, confirm, or withdraw the standard at issue. For 
confirmation, the threshold is rather low: use in at least 5 countries and 
positive vote by the simple majority of the P-members participating in the 
committee. If these members call for amendments to the standard, then the 
revision process is initiated. Use of the standard at issue in less than 5 
countries should lead to the withdrawal of that standard. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that due to the importance of protecting 
intellectual property rights in standardization activities, ISO, ITU and the 
IEC agreed on a common patent policy in 2007 to address the problems 
associated with standard-essential patents (SEP).140 In this case, substantive 
guarantees for intellectual property protection include the right of the patent 
holder to deny access to her protected right (and thus the final draft standard 
 
 137. See, e.g., ISO, Guidance for national standards bodies – Engaging stakeholders and building 
consensus, at 8–9 (2010). 
 138. See ISO/IEC, Statement on consumer participation in standardization work, ISO/IEC/GEN 
01:2001. 
 139. See, e.g., ISO, Involving consumers – Why and how, at 10–11 (2011); see also CEN/CENELEC, 
Guide 2: Consumer Interests and the preparation of European Standards, at 1–2 (1st ed., Dec. 2001). 
 140. See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at annex I. 
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should not include provisions depending on the patent right) or to disclose 
her rights and then negotiate licensing and the level of royalties under fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND).141 The policy of ISSBs 
in principle would entail a hands-off approach: patent holders would be 
entitled to defend their rights vis-à-vis potential users; yet, due to the 
importance of the standard that is based on the patented input, the holders of 
that patent would be required to negotiate agreements on the use of such 
patents on FRAND terms outside the ISSBs. 
In other words, bilateral agreements or settlement are encouraged but 
not administered by the ISSBs. Various issues of competition law nature can 
be of importance in this regard, including non-disclosure of patented rights 
in order to extract higher royalties once the standard is adopted; prohibitive 
royalties which in effect limit market access; abuse of dominant position and 
so on. Again, these are issues that would be scrutinized by domestic 
competition authorities and subsequently by courts rather than the ISSBs 
themselves.142 
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF ISO’S STANDARDIZATION-RELATED 
PRACTICES 
A. ISO at the Crossroads 
ISO has been at the forefront of international rule-making in recent 
years. In view of the importance of technical standards for economic 
development and sustainable growth, limited participation and effective 
exclusion in ISO standard-setting activities have sparked debate. More 
recently, considerable efforts were made to increase effective participation 
but also expand the substantive subject matter of the organization to include 
less technical areas such as those relating to the environment, labor, or 
human rights.143 
All in all, the ISO standard-setting process seems to be quite 
streamlined, but various, significant issues remain. For instance, recall that 
5 P-members suffice for the creation of a new TC. This would mean, at least 
in theory, that 3 P-members (simple majority) would be able to approve a 
 
 141. See generally, Patrick D. Curran, Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and 
Per Se Legality, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 983, 991—4 (2003). 
 142.  See Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. V. ZTE Corp., Judgment of the Court of July 16, 
2015 (CJEU) (discussing the rights and obligations of a SEP holder). 
 143.  See International Organization for Standardization [ISO], International Guidance Standard on 
Social Responsibility - ISO 26000 (Nov. 2010); STEPHANIE BIJLMAKERS & GEERT VAN CALSTER, You’d 
be surprised how much it costs to look this cheap! A Case-Study of ISO 26000 on Social Responsibility, 
The Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardization 275, 275−310 (Delimatsis ed. 2015). 
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new work item.144 Again, as noted above, a minimum of 4 P-members would 
be needed to commit that they will participate actively in the preparation of 
the new standard. Even so, in an organization of over 160 member bodies, 
this is too low a threshold. In addition, note that a two-thirds majority 
(following our example, that is, 3 out of the 4 P-members!) would suffice to 
bring forward the draft standard as an enquiry draft. This would mean that, 
in theory, 3 P-members could lead the entire process up to the enquiry stage. 
Crucially in practice, all ISO members (that is, not only the relevant TC 
members) will see the draft standard for the first time at the enquiry stage. 
At that moment they merely have three months to raise technical objections 
and seek changes. In view of the low threshold applied, it is questionable 
why comments should be limited to the technical aspects of the standard. 
Procedural deficiencies should be allowed to be raised by the membership at 
this level as well, all the more because these could not be raised earlier. With 
so many committees working simultaneously on a broad array of topics, one 
would reasonably assume that many members would become familiar with 
a particular standard proposed for the first time during this 3-month period 
of voting. Depending on the complexity of the technical content involved, 
while for some ISO members the time may be sufficient, for others (who 
lack a high level of sophistication in technical matters) three months would 
rather short period of time to get acquainted with complex technical matters. 
Acquisition of technical information in such a short period of time becomes 
so costly that members prefer not to seek acquiring the necessary information 
at all. If members know that their vote will not influence the final decision, 
they will not invest in information.145 
One could argue here, that even at that stage, ISO members could still 
express their disagreement to avoid the adoption of a shaky standard. In 
addition, P-members that participated in the TC work have a strong incentive 
to prepare a first-rate enquiry draft to compensate for the high start-up costs, 
but also because the more time they invest in preparing such a draft, the 
higher their interest is for such a draft to be of high quality so that it is 
accepted more easily. Furthermore, allowing voting at a very early stage may 
jeopardize the entire standard-setting process by making it overly political.146 
Thus, from this point of view, allowing any objections to be raised for 
the first time at the enquiry stage does not constitute any serious prejudice 
 
 144.  See ISO, supra note 143 at cl. 1.5.7 in conjunction with cl. 2.3.5.  
 145.  See Nicola Persico, Committee Design with Endogenous Information, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 
18 (2003). 
 146.  See David Stasavage, Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and 
International Bargaining, 58 INT’L ORG. 667, 670 (2004) (stating that transparent procedures may lead 
certain agents to posture by taking uncompromising positions that may lead to deadlock). 
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on the non-participating ISO members in the TC. This may also be in line 
with the spirit of ISO voting: ISO does not introduce a general decision-
making system, but a de facto supermajority system whereby votes 
presuppose information acquisition. It is contestation on the technical 
grounds that can improve a given standard—and such contestation can even 
occur at the enquiry stage. 
Both views presented here have their value and are sensible. However, 
even if the latter view is correct, no plausible reason seems to exist that 
would prevent TC members from sharing information with all ISO members 
about work on a new standard early on. For instance, while the committee 
draft stage seems to be quite important and various procedural guarantees 
are in place (for instance, prompt notification; notice and comment 
procedures; requirement to respond to all comments; revisions to be 
subsequently circulated), this stage is limited to the ISO members 
participating in the relevant committee. Whereas the committee draft stage 
appears to play a crucial role in line with the core principles of due process, 
the Directives suggest that, under certain circumstances, this important stage 
can be skipped if consensus (as defined within ISO) among the P-members 
is achieved.147 
A notification requirement towards all ISO members would constitute 
a procedural guarantee with immediate positive impact on the substantive 
rights of other ISO members. Such information, for instance, could be 
publicly available on the ISO website with a short, expedited 
notification/alert system. In extreme cases of opposition within a TC, early 
(perhaps indicative) voting could act as an alternative buffer that allows 
certain standards to move forward, provided that the broader ISO 
membership supports them despite opposition within the TC. Finally, 
objections should be allowed to be raised—and appeal procedures should 
allow for that—if any ISO member can prove serious prejudice to its rights. 
Significant path dependencies remain within ISO, as the previous 
analysis demonstrated, alluding sometimes to the need for a shift in ISO’s 
modus operandi: for one, the political dimension of ISO standard-setting 
appears not to be yet of immediate concern for the ISO leadership. This 
becomes obvious when we look at the imbalances between the rights of P-
members, on one hand, and the other ISO members, on the other; the late 
notification of draft standards to all ISO members (inquiry drafts); the lack 
of any weight being given to negative votes which are not based on technical 
considerations; or, again, the limited possibilities for appeals which are not 
premised on technical grounds. Whereas the requirement for giving reasons 
 
 147.  See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 9696, annex SS. 
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is generally of a due process nature and aims at limiting arbitrary objections 
and delays, the non-participating ISO members in the relevant TC would 
more often than not ignore basic technical features of a particular standard 
that is presented to them as an inquiry draft. Those participating actively (P-
members), on the other hand, would have the necessary information. 
It seems that attempting to remedy this asymmetry of information at the 
enquiry stage only is irrational. Rather, it achieves the opposite of what an 
inclusive international organization should be striving for: it appears to 
accentuate the gap between the more sophisticated—technically speaking—
ISO members, and those which struggle to build capacity. The latter 
(admittedly, less informed members), when facing an enquiry draft would 
prefer to abstain148 or even cast a positive vote,149 which nevertheless is not 
necessarily based on a full grasp of what the standard stands for. Thus, the 
requirement for giving technical reasons appears to function as a 
presumption of fitness for purpose of the enquiry draft. This presumption is 
rebuttable, but obviously not many ISO members will have the capacities 
and knowledge to rebut effectively. 
This excessive focus on the technical aspects of standardization and late 
notification of proposed draft standards may lead to undue dominance of 
certain ISO members—most likely the sophisticated ones. This approach 
offers little in the effort to establish more inclusive forms of governance at 
the international level. This situation may perpetuate even at the post-
adoption stage: at the moment of review of a given standard, the use of a 
given standard by just 5 countries would be sufficient for a standard to be 
regarded as an international standard of global relevance for ISO purposes. 
Other than the practice of exclusion that such a low threshold implies, it is 
also indicative of generally low thresholds that are set by the Directives with 
respect to key aspects of standard-setting, as mentioned earlier. 
Active participation is one of the ISO principles according to the ISO 
Code of Conduct for the technical work.150 This justifies the privileged status 
that P-members enjoy within ISO—a kind of reward for their willingness to 
invest in promoting standard-setting (e.g., through active participation in the 
 
 148.  In that case, because voting becomes costly for the uninformed voters (the price for acquiring 
information), they prefer to delegate their votes to the informed ones. See Timothy J. Feddersen & 
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, The Swing Voter’s Curse, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 408, 408−10 (1996) (describing 
the behavior of uninformed voters in choosing between political candidates). 
 149.  For instance, they may cast a positive vote if they believe that the promoters of the standard 
would not jeopardize their reputation to bring forward for voting a standard of dubious quality. See Gilat 
Levy, Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 
150, 150−52 (2007). 
 150.  International Organization for Standardization [ISO], ISO Code of Conduct for the Technical 
Work (2016). 
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early stages of new work items; the running of secretariats, convenerships, 
or other leadership positions; or the posting of technical comments). This, 
however, neglects at the same time to acknowledge that standard-setting is 
inextricably linked with learning-by-doing; effective participation on a 
broader basis will never occur without capacity-building. This is the reason 
why the system of twinning is a noteworthy initiative that may change—
even if only at a slow pace—the ecology of international technical standard-
setting, just as regional standard-setting initiatives in the developing world 
have. The case of the EU is telling in this respect. It is by now accepted that 
the empowerment of the European standard-setting bodies through the New 
Approach within the EU also had beneficial effects for the weight of the 
EU’s bargaining power within ISSBs. 
Participation in standard-setting is not only a matter of states, but very 
much of non-state actors, including industry, consumer or labor associations, 
NGOs, or other private interest groups. ISO claims to carry out its work in 
an “international, multi-stakeholder, multi-sector environment.”151 
Nevertheless, in principle, ISO would encourage its members to involve 
stakeholder interests at the national level, which then would have to be taken 
into account when preparing the national position of the representative SSB 
at ISO. With respect to consumer interests, COPOLCO has been active in 
addressing consumer-related aspects of standards by publishing guides 
instead of ordinary ISO standards. COPOLCO works under the ISO general 
Secretariat’s responsibility, which appears difficult to square with the 
member-driven tradition of ISO. 
In the face of increasing criticism, ISO has attempted to open up its 
doors to consumers directly. For instance, Consumers International, a global 
federation of consumer organizations from over 110 countries, has 
established a liaison with COPOLCO. The relationship, however, is rather 
asymmetrical, with P-Members still leading the discussions and ensuing 
decisions within COPOLCO. This approach becomes increasingly 
untenable: as noted earlier, whereas producers used to be the only demanders 
of international standards, nowadays consumers also seek the adoption of 
international standards that take their concerns into account. Increasing labor 
mobility and cross-border safety concerns due to defective products can 
indeed lead to more proactive advocacy on the side of consumers at the 
international level. The same goes for labor organizations in certain areas of 
 
 151.  Id. 
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ISO standard-setting, such as management and production systems.152 Thus, 
groups other than producers may have a substantial interest in participation. 
In addition, the expansion of the ISO agenda may lead to awkward 
results in view of the upgrade that the ISO output has experienced after the 
adoption of the TBT agreement. This became particularly apparent in the 
negotiations that led to the promulgation of the ISO 26000 guidance 
document on social responsibility.153 Although generally regarded as an 
international standard for ISO purposes, the document clarifies that it must 
not be considered as such for the purposes of the TBT agreement. Nor is it 
intended to provide a basis for any assumption or finding that a measure is 
consistent with WTO obligations, thereby discrediting the value of Article 
2.4 TBT when assessing this particular ISO deliverable. As noted in the 
relevant literature, this exercise of self-restraint vis-à-vis the TBT agreement 
by ISO was the result of intense negotiations within the multi-stakeholder 
working group on social responsibility to limit the scope of the final 
product.154 However, one wonders whether this is the price to pay for a more 
open approach on standard-setting and if so, what repercussions it may have 
on the relationship between ISO and WTO if such an approach spills over 
beyond guidance documents. 
Experimenting with new forms of standard-setting such as multi-
stakeholder standardization may be time-consuming, as it brings with it new 
ethos in the discussions, and thus takes traditional standard-setters—that 
focus predominantly on the technical aspects of the deliverables—out of 
their comfort zone. As the negotiations on the ISO 26000 showed, learning-
by-doing has its consequences: it took about six years to finalize the guidance 
document, which is of a softer nature than a traditional ISO standard, as it 
cannot be used for third-party certification. 
Even so, the ISO 26000, with its “alternative production line” model, is 
a worthwhile standard-setting effort in view of the interests that were 
gathered to shape it: experts from more than 90 countries and 40 international 
or broadly-based regional organizations representing governments, NGOs, 
 
 152.  Of course, questions of legitimacy, representation, participation and accountability can equally 
be raised with respect to consumer and labor organizations pointing to the need for benchmarking and 
potential reforms. In an era of increased legalization of rule-making at the international level, no actor 
active at this level is immune from such scrutiny. However, exclusion clearly is not an answer to such 
potential problems, all the more because evidence in certain sectors shows how important the background 
of standard-setters is for the final design of the standard. See Abigail Allen & Karthik Ramanna, Towards 
an Understanding of the Role of Standard Setters in Standard Setting, 55 J. ACCOUNT. ECON. 66, 79−81 
(2013) (examining the role of individual standard setters on accounting standards). 
 153.  See ISO supra note143. 
 154.  See BIJLMAKERS & CALSTER supra note 143, at 300. 
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consumer associations, industries, and so on came together to agree on a 
single guidance document.155 For ISO, this exercise is not only a matter of 
substance and scope, but also a matter of continuing relevance: with ever-
increasing competition coming from ISEAL alliance, GlobalG.A.P.,156 and 
other newcomers in the standard-setting market and with much focus shifting 
towards sustainability of production methods and global supply chains, ISO 
cannot simply disregard these voices.157 Although these relatively new self-
regulatory bodies have a different, partly morally motivated background,158 
their ever-growing appeal may reveal shifts in moral preferences that cannot 
be overlooked. Therefore, it appears opportune that ISO expands its agenda 
and, by implication, the interests represented at the standard-setting table in 
view of its dominant position in this area of transnational rule-making.159 
Excluded voices within ISO will most likely default if they see that chances 
of being heard are low. In such cases, they will look for other opportunities 
to fill what they perceive as a lacuna in international standard-setting 
matters.160 
B. Reviewing ISO Practices Against the Principles of the TBT Committee 
Decision 
Respect of the TBT principles on the development of international 
standards may have the same result. Interestingly, the ISO Code of Conduct 
adheres strictly to the six TBT principles:161 transparency; openness; 
impartiality and consensus; effectiveness and relevance; coherence; and the 
“development dimension” (that is, as noted earlier, the requirement to 
address the concerns of developing countries) figure prominently in the 
ISO’s Code of Conduct. These principles have been upgraded to become 
 
 155.  Participation, however, has been unequally distributed, with industry and governments together 
appointing about half of the experts in the Working Group. See Bart Slob & Gerard Oonk, The ISO 
Working Group on Social Responsibility: Developing the Future ISO SR 26000 Standard, SOMO 
Briefing Paper, Mar. 2007, at 2. 
 156.  G.A.P. stands for good agricultural practice. See Hachez & Wouters supra note 78, at 679. 
 157.  See Panagiotis Delimatsis, Sustainable standard-setting, climate change and the TBT 
Agreement, in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE LAW (Panagiotis 
Delimatsis ed., 2016), 148. 
  158. Cf. David P. Baron, Morally Motivated Self-Regulation, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1299, 1299 
(2010). 
 159.  See generally, Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: 
Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211 (2014). 
 160.  ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 161.  See ISO Code of Conduct supra note 150150. 
DELIMATSIS FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018 7:57 PM 
312 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 28:273 
“the key principles of international standardization.”162 Thus, not only are 
the TBT principles endorsed by ISO, but they have also allegedly become 
guiding principles for its technical work.163 
If this is a correct assumption, then no proper interpretation of these 
principles can take place without reference to the initial source document of 
these principles, which is the TBT Committee Decision.164 In other words, 
these principles do not have an ISO-specific meaning, but rather a WTO 
meaning, as elaborated in the TBT Committee Decision of 2000, subsequent 
meetings of the TBT Committee (e.g., the triennial reviews of the TBT 
Agreement) and as spelled out in the Panel and Appellate Body rulings such 
as the US—Tuna II ruling or future WTO disputes on TBT matters.165 The 
successful achievement of the trade-enabling objectives of the TBT 
agreement passes through the development of international standards, which 
in turn raises the bar as to due process expectations within ISSBs.166 
With respect to the first two principles, the Decision is indicative of 
WTO Members’ intent to ensure that the development of international 
standards takes place transparently and through wide participation. 
With regards to transparency, the TBT Committee Decision requires 
that adequate time and opportunities be provided for written comments. In 
addition, the Decision appears to require dissemination of relevant 
information to all members of the standard-setting body early in the 
standard-setting process, much earlier than the current ISO procedures 
would provide. When this principle is assessed against the ISO practices, 
there seems to be room for major improvements in the ISO mechanics. 
In the first reaction by ISO to the TBT Committee Decision, ISO turned 
a deaf ear to the requirement of transparency as enunciated in the Decision. 
It recalled its decentralized nature to claim that it is for ISO member bodies 
 
 162.  Id. at 4. 
 163.  Note that ISO has an observer status at the TBT Committee and regularly informs the 
Committee of its activities and plans. 
 164.  See WTO, TBT Committee, supra note 39. 
 165.  The TBT Committee Decision appears to reflect WTO Members’ prevailing normative view as 
to standards development. In the current NAMA negotiations, the Decision has informed Members’ 
positions regarding the definition of international standards and the traits of ISSBs. See WTO, Negotiating 
Group on Market Access, ‘Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products – International Standardisation’, 
Communication from the European Union, India, Indonesia, Norway, Philippines, Switzerland and 
Thailand, WTO Doc. TN/MA/W/142, 13 April 2011. 
 166.  See US – Tuna II, supra note 1817, at n.745 (“WTO Members see representative participation 
and the observance of due process in the development of international standards as essential to the 
achievement of the trade facilitating objectives of the TBT Agreement.”). 
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to inform domestic constituents,167 thereby neglecting the importance of 
direct communication and information channels that should be in place in 
view of the normative power that ISO has gained in the last two decades and 
the increasingly prominent role that it plays in international economic 
governance as a key trade-enabling institution. 
Admittedly, ISO’s move towards a more assertive role in international 
matters is slow. To date, ISO’s approach vis-à-vis transparency and 
participation seems to be based on the publication of guides addressed to the 
national standard-setting bodies calling for more effective communication 
channels and dissemination of ISO’s work at the national level, as well as 
for the adoption of an inclusive multi-stakeholder philosophy when 
establishing the national stance on a given subject discussed within ISO. It 
is doubtful at best whether this approach would be regarded as consistent 
with the TBT Committee Decision if it were put to test before the WTO 
judiciary. 
With respect to openness, the Decision requires the existence of 
meaningful opportunities for participation at all stages of standards 
development.168 According to ISO, it is for ISO members to assess their 
technical capacity and accordingly decide their membership status (O-, P-, 
subscriber or correspondent membership). While ISO is probably right to 
argue that “it is neither effective nor efficient to have all developing countries 
participate in all standard-setting activities at the international level,”169 there 
is a clear imbalance in the distribution of technical work and leadership tasks 
within ISO, which obviously mirrors decades of knowledge acquisition on 
the side of developed countries. 
While it is indeed sensible to encourage developing countries to 
organize themselves at the regional level hoping for better representation at 
the ISO level, schemes and mechanisms that would offer direct access to ISO 
standardization activities are necessary. The mechanism of twinning can 
only be considered as a necessary but insufficient instrument towards more 
effective participation. In addition, effective participation implies a 
significantly costly endeavor: absent financial means directed towards 
facilitating more regular participation by a broad ISO membership base, 
much of the work within TCs is dominated by industry-driven developed 
 
 167.  See ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at cl. 1.7.1.; see also WTO, TBT Committee, supra 
note 39, at para. 6. After more than ten years, ISO’s approach on the matter remained unchanged. See 
WTO, TBT Committee, ‘ISO and IEC Comments on India’s Submission on International Standard (IS) 
Setting’, WTO Doc. G/TBT/GEN/129, Apr. 2, 2012, at para. 5. 
 168.  See US Tuna–II, supra note18, at ¶ 369ff, at 142. 
 169.  See WTO, TBT Committee, supra note39, at ¶ 6. 
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country interests which have the necessary financial means to hold 
convenerships or TCs.170 Such embedded practices have led certain scholars 
to talk of transnational corporate domination171 of the process of drafting 
standards. This phenomenon may be worrisome in terms of fairness and 
participation, but, more fundamentally, of legitimacy. 
The Decision further clarifies the importance of impartiality and 
consensus-building in ISSBs. Whereas it underlines the importance of 
meaningful opportunities to contribute to the elaboration of an international 
standard so that the entire process does not tilt towards the preferences of the 
few, it is more accommodating with respect to consensus, acknowledging 
indirectly that a decision-making system that takes into account the views of 
all parties concerned and seeks to reconcile conflicting arguments can meet 
the requirement enshrined in the Decision. Thus, the ISO’s double consensus 
(as noted earlier, two-thirds rule within the TC and 75% of the votes cast) 
seems to meet the requirement of consensus within the Decision. 
Recently, it was proposed that ISSBs follow the WTO consensus rule 
(a negative vote would amount to a veto right) or increase the threshold for 
adoption.172 ISO was not in favor of changing a decision-making system in 
which objections were a rare phenomenon. Within the WTO, the idea of 
raising the threshold does not seem to gather sufficient support, all the more 
because the underlying rationale is everything but clear. Rather, WTO 
Members seem to agree that, more fundamentally, it is about arguments 
rather than votes. Therefore, setting minimum benchmarks for consensus 
would be rather pointless.173 One can only agree with this observation: 
raising the minimum percentage of consensus would leave the problem of 
varying and unbalanced expertise within the ISO community intact. 
Opposing voices would still need to refer to technical reasons to challenge 
any given standard—and for that, a sophisticated level of capacity-building 
and ensuing expertise would be warranted. 
A further source of future concern for ISO may potentially be an 
observation by the Appellate Body in US—Tuna II made in passu. As noted 
 
 170.  See also ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 68, at 267. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  India suggested that this threshold cannot be lower than 90%. See WTO, TBT Committee, 
Principles of International Standard Setting, WTO Doc. G/TBT/W/345 (Nov. 10, 2011), at 2. 
 173.  See the discussion within the TBT Committee in WTO, TBT Committee, Minutes of the 
meeting of 10-11 November 2011, WTO Doc. G/TBT/M/55 (Feb. 2, 2012), at ¶ 285ff, 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList= 
89001,43462,51482,89194,92796,80305,97330,86176,98233,60846&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&Full
TextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True 
[https://perma.cc/LTM3-KL8X]. 
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earlier, the US argued that AIDCP, the standard suggested by Mexico, was 
not a relevant international standard for various reasons, including because 
it did not allow for the participation of consumer and conservation interests 
in its standard-related activities.174 Arguably, for the resolution of the 
dispute, it was immaterial whether the Appellate Body ruled on that claim. 
Astonishingly, the Appellate Body decided to go on and answer the US 
claim. Without any meticulous analysis, it agreed that an international body 
must not privilege any particular interests when developing international 
standards. The Appellate Body premised its finding on the heading of the 
TBT Committee Decision relating to impartiality and consensus.175 
However, a proper interpretation of that particular heading and of the 
previous drafts reveals that Members were unwilling to broaden so 
extensively the circle of relevant entities participating in the standards 
development process. Rather, the Members were concerned with the very 
effective access of their national or local standard-setting bodies to 
international standardization. Consumer associations or preservation-related 
NGOs did not seem to be within the circle of participants in the standard-
setting processes that the WTO Members envisaged when adopting the TBT 
Committee Decision. 
Thus, whereas the Appellate Body erred in this particular regard, a 
further confirmation of this finding in a future WTO dispute will be 
problematic for ISO. While generally open, as noted earlier, the ISO still 
does not allow such a great variety of interests to participate in the ISO 
processes. The constitution and function of COPOLCO (discussed earlier) 
illustrates this point quite powerfully. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why 
we witness the emergence of alternative standard-setting bodies such as the 
ISEAL Alliance or GlobalG.A.P., where such interests find expression and 
can voice their concerns and interests. Accordingly, this finding by the 
Appellate Body may open the door for more diversity within the ISO in the 
medium run. 
Effectiveness and relevance is the fourth principle set out in the 
Decision, which requires that ISSBs (1) take into account relevant regulatory 
or market needs, and scientific and technological developments in the 
elaboration of standards; (2) put in place procedures aimed at identifying and 
reviewing standards that have become obsolete, inappropriate or ineffective; 
and (3) establish or maintain communication channels with the WTO. 
Regarding market relevance vis-à-vis a specific work item, the Directives 
include an important set of substantive guarantees to ensure the market 
 
  174.  See supra US – Tuna II, note 18, at ¶ 383. 
  175.  Id. ¶ 384.  
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relevance of new proposals for standards development. As mentioned earlier, 
the burden of proof lies with the P-member that proposes new work. The ISO 
TMB had established a global relevance policy as early as in 2003, worried 
that its relevance for TBT purposes may be questioned. Interestingly, the 
Directives suggest that the adoption of the TBT “placed an obligation on ISO 
to ensure that the International Standards [sic] it develops, adopts and 
publishes are globally relevant.” (Emphasis added).176 The TMB understands 
what is at stake: a standard failing to meet the requirements of the TBT 
Committee Decision may be challenged as creating a barrier to trade. 
Global relevance is defined within ISO as “required characteristics of 
an International Standard that it can be used/implemented as broadly as 
possible by affected industries and other stakeholders in markets around the 
world.”177 As the intent is to capture and accommodate market dynamics 
through ISO standard-setting, regional or national differences would not 
normally be taken further unless they are essential (e.g., related to climate 
differences, anthropometry, or embedded technological infrastructures) and 
thus are typically not subject to change and adaptation. Where such concerns 
are present, the ISO approach on introducing a unique international solution 
through standard-setting would not hold; rather, these concerns would need 
to be addressed. 
Again, within ISO, it is for the TC, and more specifically, the P-
Members, to examine and confirm the global relevance of a given (new) 
work item and raise any essential differences that should be included in the 
standards. The latter should be presented to the other P-members of the 
relevant TC for approval as early as possible and at the latest at the 
Committee draft stage.178 Provided that essential differences eventually form 
part of the draft international standard, negative votes cannot be premised 
solely on the fact of such an inclusion. 
As noted earlier, there do not seem to be any compelling reasons for 
limiting to P-members the right of raising essential differences. Furthermore, 
there is no review mechanism regarding the approval (or not) of such 
 
 176.  ISO/IEC Directives, supra note 96, at annex SM.1. The Annex reproduces the document on 
ISO/TMB Policy and Principles Statement – Global Relevance of ISO Technical Work and Publications. 
It reiterates the list of substantive criteria that determine the global relevance of a given standard to be 
found in the TBT Committee Decision (effectively respond to regulatory and market needs; respond to 
scientific and technical developments in various countries; not hinder fair competition or innovation; and 
be performance-based). 
 177.  Id. annex SM.2. 
 178.  See ISO/TMB Implementation Guidance – Global Relevance of ISO Technical Work and 
Publications, at 10, annex 2 (2004), http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_tmb_implementation_guidance_global_ 
relevance.pdf [https://perma.cc/ U5MM-4892] (last visited on Feb. 18, 2017). 
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requests within a given TC (other than the general appeal mechanism within 
ISO, the use of which is, again, largely limited to P-members). The TMB 
does not seem to play any immediate role here as a more neutral control 
mechanism.179 Indeed, depending on the dynamics within a TC, undermining 
the importance of essential differences raised may be the prevailing stance: 
intuitively, most P-members would have no incentive to create loopholes 
within a given standard. Increased compliance costs or delays in finalizing 
the Committee draft may be some of the reasons that would justify such an 
opposition by P-members within a TC. 
At the post-adoption stage, ISO includes a review mechanism of 
standards and technical specifications. However, a systematic impact 
assessment instrument does not form part of the ISO standard-setting system. 
Nor is such a requirement imposed by the TBT Committee Decision. 
However, the possibility of including such a requirement was proposed as a 
useful tool to ensure the continuous relevance and efficacy of a given 
standard.180 For instance, competing SSBs such as the ISEAL Alliance 
adopted an Impacts Code that requires the assessment of repercussions on 
various fields both during the drafting and after the adoption of ISEAL 
sustainability standards. 
The fifth principle of the Decision is coherence, which, pursuant to the 
Decision, points to the need for cooperation and coordination with other 
relevant ISSBs to avoid duplication or overlap. Thus, the concept of 
coherence does not refer here to the standards and standard-setting processes 
within a single ISSB, but rather the appropriate relationship among 
institutions with similar functions. ISO has such mechanisms in place, at 
least with respect to IEC at the international level,181 but also CEN at the 
regional level.182 
 
 179.  See id. at 3–4. The document suggests that, in case of doubt and absent a resolution of the 
concern at the TC level, the TMB may be asked to review the details to provide advice/direction to the 
relevant TC. However, this is an informal, conciliatory role that the TMB may play with no reference as 
to when and how the TMB will indeed intervene. 
 180.  See TBT Committee, Principles of International Standard Setting, supra note 172, at 3. 
 181.  Annex B of the ISO/IEC Directives suggests that ISO and IEC together form a system for 
international standardization as a whole. Indeed, these two ISSBs account for about 85% of international 
product standards. See Tim Büthe, Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins and Institutional 
Development of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 12 BUS. & POL. 1, 5 (2010). Annex 
B describes precisely how work is allocated and liaison works between the two institutions. For the most 
sensitive, unresolved questions of coordination and work allocation the ISO/IEC Joint Technical 
Advisory Board may be consulted. 
 182.  See The Agreement on Technical Cooperation Between ISO and CEN (Vienna Agreement), ¶ 
5 (1991), http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/3146825/4229629/4230450/4230458/ 
01__Agreement_on_Technical_Cooperation_between_ISO_and_CEN_(Vienna_Agreement).pdf?nodei
d=4230688&vernum=-2 [https://perma.cc/3R3R-MD66]. This Agreement becomes operational through 
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The Vienna Agreement and the subsequently adopted guidelines are 
monitored by the Joint Co-ordination group of the TMB and the CEN 
Technical Board (CEN/BT) and entail two options for collaborative 
standard-setting: the ISO lead and the CEN lead. Thus, while recognizing 
the primacy of international standards, this cooperation agreement results in 
the CEN becoming a decentralized agent (and preferred strategic partner) for 
the development of new standards. The Guidelines provide that, if the 
expected results are not achieved, ISO or CEN can proceed separately in the 
development of standards. In addition, when the CEN lead is opted for (and 
for this a simple majority of the non-CEN P-Members of the ISO TC is 
required), CEN should ensure the due process rights of non-CEN ISO 
members (for instance, by adequately responding to their comments). Under 
certain circumstances, and regardless of whether ISO or CEN were the lead 
organization, a decision may be reached to approve a given standard within 
ISO and CEN in parallel. 
The last principle that the Decision identifies is addressing the concerns 
of developing countries. The Decision recognizes the challenges of ensuring 
effective participation in international standard-setting that these countries 
have diachronically faced. Notably, the Decision requires that “tangible” 
ways of effective participation of developing countries must be sought. 
However, arguably in line with the soft, hortatory for the most part, language 
that is used in the WTO provisions relating to special and differential 
treatment for developing countries, the Decision defines this requirement in 
a negative manner in that it requires no de facto exclusion from the 
standardization processes within the relevant ISSB. 
As noted earlier, ISO has developed an action plan for developing 
countries for the period of 2016-2020. This is the third five-year action plan 
adopted by ISO, which succeeded the triennial programs adopted in the 
previous decade.183 DEVCO monitors the proper execution of the action 
plan. Nevertheless, the structure of DEVCO may not be the most adequate 
one for accommodating developing countries’ concerns.184 The current 
action plan entails a targeted approach with five intended “outcomes,” 
including increased participation in the technical work. The plan, however, 
remains relatively vague in several instances, whereas under certain outputs, 
it appears that the language used is hortatory. 
 
the Guidelines for the implementation of the Agreement on Technical Cooperation between ISO and CEN 
(the Vienna Agreement), 6th ed., January 2014.  
 183.  The execution of the action plan is among the key priorities of the ISO Strategic Plan 2016-
2020. See ISO Strategy 2016-2020, 2015, at https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/archive/ 
pdf/en/iso_strategy_2016-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NPL-AL4U]. 
 184.  Recall that many developing countries are only O-members in DEVCO, which undermines 
their chances for meaningful participation and influence. 
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Under these circumstances surrounding developing country 
participation, the direction that the action plan takes, even if unsatisfactory, 
appears eventually to be the correct one: actions for the strengthening of 
domestic standardization (including deliberation and multi-stakeholder input 
gathering or reinforcing the national quality infrastructure) processes are 
coupled with actions within ISO, most prominently the twinning program. 
However, measuring performance at the end of each action plan is a 
prerequisite for identifying tangible benefits in drawing regular action plans 
of this type. 
Twinning can be more effective than many other technical assistance 
initiatives designed within the ISO Committee on developing country 
matters (DEVCO). However, there are some worrisome signs relating to this 
initiative: a recent survey showed that more than fifty percent of these 
agreements are informal despite the existence of an ISO template.185 It also 
showed that the main beneficiaries of such agreements were the Chinese (23 
agreements) and Brazilian (9 agreements) SSBs (as of September 2013).186 
While not perfect, twinning is a very promising instrument that may 
force changes in perceptions and reforms in the domestic SSBs involved. It 
can lead to more serious efforts for mutual understanding, respect, and 
eventually trust. It is quite telling that ISO national standards bodies from 
developing countries largely remain governmental agencies, whereas one 
would expect that private and multi-stakeholder participation leads to a 
hybrid form of representation, acknowledging the fact that, in most cases, 
technical knowledge and know-how is vested with private, industry-driven 
actors. Twinning may instigate reflection and expeditious action towards the 
creation of more efficient structures with a view to becoming more eloquent, 
outspoken, and confident at the ISO level. This will be beneficial for the ISO 
as well because more voices may raise fundamental issues of relevance for 
certain standards (for instance, due to important regional needs and 
peculiarities). Finally, one cannot emphasize enough the importance of 
increasing mutual trust and enduring professional relationships among 
participants in the international standardization process. 
All in all, even if the approach vis-à-vis developing countries’ 
participation as expressed in the current Action Plan appears to go in the 
right direction at first blush, no systematic and rigorous review of the impact 
 
 185.  To assist in striking such agreements, ISO has prepared a twinning agreement template: 
Twinning Agreement template, www.iso.org/iso/twinning_agreement_template.doc (last visited Feb. 15, 
2017). 
 186.  The study was conducted by the Japanese Standards Association, available at: 
https://www.jsa.or.jp/datas/media/10000/md_1186.pdf.  
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of such programs and plans (for instance, the ISO Action Plan 2005-2010) 
seems to have taken place to date.187 In addition, previous initiatives such as 
the Forum on Standards Actions in the Global Market (SGM Forum) had 
mixed results. 
The above analysis suggests that, although far from being flawless, the 
ISO efforts to address standards development-related developing country 
concerns are going in the right direction, in view of the organization’s 
diachronic structural bias towards the most advanced global standard-setters, 
that is, the traditional players from developed countries. ISO has made good 
faith efforts to become more inclusive, but the need for reform is not limited 
at the ISO level; rather, effective participation is also a function of the level 
of—and determination for—reforms domestically. In other words, no 
change in effective participation levels will occur without empowerment of 
domestic standards development bodies and guarantees for respect of due 
process rights of stakeholders at the domestic level. It is no coincidence that 
ISO insists on the six principles being respected not only by TCs at the ISO 
level, but also by national standards bodies, notably those of openness, 
transparency, and impartiality. 
Overall, ISO activities and processes appear to be guided to a large 
extent by the six principles enshrined in the TBT Committee Decision, but 
full compliance cannot be claimed as of yet. It appears that a more thorough 
review of ISO practices against the principles of the TBT Committee 
Decision will most likely trigger a reform of standard-setting practices and 
should be expected to lead to a new approach in transnational standard-
setting. Standard-setting 2.0 is bound to happen, as voices for more openness 
and inclusiveness from those hardly involved to date and other international 
organizations sharing similar objectives, such as the WTO, multiply. 
A remaining interpretive issue of systemic importance is whether 
failure to comply with one of the TBT principles may be sufficient to 
question ISO’s compliance with the TBT Committee Decision and thus 
jeopardize the relevance of ISO’s standards for WTO purposes. In other 
words, is the adherence to all principles a precondition for a given ISSB to 
receive TBT clearance in accordance with Article 2.4 TBT or would a more 
holistic inquiring exercise of the ISSB’s overall activities and procedures 
have to take place, balancing all existing evidence? In US—Tuna II, the 
Appellate Body did not seem to exclude the latter possibility, as it observed 
that “to the extent that a standardizing body complies with the principles and 
 
 187.  DEVCO appears to be sending questionnaires to beneficiaries of activities implemented under 
the current Action Plan to assess their impact but it is unclear how these feed into the subsequent action 
plans. See DEVCO 47th meeting – Working Documents, St. Petersburg, Sep. 16-17, 2013, at 40. 
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procedures that WTO Members have decided ‘should be observed’ in the 
development of international standards, it would be easier to find that the 
body has ‘recognized activities in standardization.’”188 
A proper reading of the Appellate Body’s approach suggests that no 
mechanical analysis of compliance of ISO (or, indeed, of any ISSB at issue) 
with the six principles of the TBT Committee Decision would be opted for. 
Rather, a broad assessment of the practices of the relevant ISSB would be 
made, along with an analysis of the procedures that led to the adoption of the 
standard at hand before a final decision can be reached as to the relevance of 
such a standard for TBT purposes. 
Taking ISO as an example, then, the WTO adjudicating bodies would 
have a dual mission: first, to examine whether ISO practices comply with the 
Decision in general, and, second, whether the Decision was respected when 
the specific ISO standard at issue was adopted. This would be the direct 
implication and natural consequence of the fact that, as submitted earlier, the 
characteristics of the process followed for the eventual adoption of a given 
ISO standard affect the ultimate authority and value of that standard. 
V. CONCLUSION 
International standardization is key for economic growth and 
innovation. In addition, economic evidence suggests that standardization has 
contributed to trade much more than any trade agreement could ever have.189 
ISSBs constitute a forum that fosters the competition of ideas, whereby one 
of them (or a combination thereof) will become the reference point for 
production processes and methods globally. Technical merit and non-
economic considerations battle for relevance, whereas the relevant SSBs try 
to ensure their smooth functioning. As such, clashes of conflicting values 
can easily lead to a paralysis of their activities. It is important to acknowledge 
that ISO has no easy mix of tasks to execute in this respect, pending between 
identification of technical superiority and guaranteeing openness and 
transparency. 
When it comes to procedural and substantive safeguards in global 
institutions, setting the bar too high may be misleading, as it does not capture 
the idiosyncrasies of hybrid, voluntary-based institutions active at the 
transnational level.190 Rather, ensuring a fair representation of a wide array 
of affected interests in the standard-setting process should be the objective 
 
 188.  See US – Tuna II supra note 18 at, ¶376, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012). 
 189.  See Daniel Bernhofen, Zouheir El-Sahli & Richard Kneller, Estimating the Effects of the 
Container Revolution on World Trade, 98 J. INT’L ECON. 36, 46 (2016). 
 190.  See Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a “Democratic Deficit” in World Politics? A Framework for 
Analysis, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 336 , 337 (2004). 
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of any transnational rule-maker. At the institutional level, responsive statutes 
and internal regulations should be in place, allowing for adjustments when 
needed and ex post control. 
Technocratic legitimacy may not be sufficient to discharge ISO of the 
obligations that it has as the global leader in standard-setting. As described 
earlier, ISO has undertaken serious good faith efforts to address complaints 
regarding its standard-setting processes; notably with respect to 
participation, relevance, and coherence. Its observer status at the TBT 
Committee also helped gauge the pulse of those WTO Members—
developing countries for the most part—who believe that access to ISO 
standard-setting is still intractable. 
The world of voluntary standards has evolved to affect more parties 
globally than initially expected. The early immunity that it enjoyed at the 
international level due to its non-public nature has eroded after the 
“multilateralization” of the TBT Agreement. The voluntary character of 
standards remained, but the advent of the WTO changed the impact of 
international standards for good. Regulatory convergence and reduction of 
non-tariff barriers would now pass through the adoption of these standards, 
which were regarded as authoritative expressions of technical excellence 
internationally. Indeed, the TBT took an orthodox view vis-à-vis 
international standards: standards improve product efficiency and facilitate 
trade, notably when adopted at the international level, as compliance costs 
are reduced. Therefore, adherence to international standards becomes a 
necessary condition for the very attainment of the TBT objectives. 
Importantly, no grandfathering would be accepted: as established by the 
WTO Appellate Body in EC—Sardines, even standards adopted before the 
creation of the WTO would be considered to assess the consistency of the 
regulatory instruments of a given WTO member with the TBT. Non-
compliance with these mandatory benchmarks for domestic technical 
regulations would raise suspicions as to the good intentions of governmental 
intervention. 
The ISO and the WTO run parallel lives and pursue similar missions 
focusing on improving market access in a cost-effective manner. The 
emergence of new players in the international scene seeking to shape rule-
making in international affairs more actively has played no less a significant 
role in increasing the impact of international standard-setting. Previously run 
in essence by the developed world, the international standardization 
community attracted the interest of an ever-increasing number of parties and 
thus had to become more inclusive without, however, putting into jeopardy 
its effectiveness with respect to consolidating technological advances. 
Admittedly, no empowerment of new ISO members is possible without 
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effective participation. Therefore, strengthening procedural rights is the 
gateway to more inclusive and representative international standards. In turn, 
only higher levels of participation can reduce the knowledge gap between 
developed and developing countries. 
This much-needed reform in ISSBs and the ISO has been the result of 
developments within the TBT Committee, most notably the adoption of the 
TBT Committee Decision in 2000. Analysis of this Decision and its potential 
impact has been surprisingly scarce to date. It is the first time in the WTO 
that the delegation of regulatory power to ISSBs was made conditional upon 
adherence to a series of principles, mainly of procedural due process in 
nature. This Decision was vested with substantial legal value through the 
US—Tuna II ruling, showing the potential “bite” of WTO adjudication as an 
ex post legitimating device for international standardization: output by 
standards organizations will be critically reviewed and perhaps discarded if 
it fails to satisfy the principles set out in the Decision. The principles are 
quite demanding and few ISSBs would manage to meet each one of them 
and in a cumulative manner.191 
Discussion of ISO standards has been a rare phenomenon in WTO 
adjudication.192 One reason for this may be that WTO Members consider ISO 
to function relatively well, in a transparent, open, and efficient manner. 
However, as suggested in this article, closer scrutiny of ISO may prove 
otherwise. Using the example of ISO, this article critically reviewed the 
procedural and substantive guarantees that are in place to ensure that 
international standards adopted in international standardization fora are in 
line with basic tenets of due process or transparency. One of the most 
powerful findings of this article is that the reform of ISO processes has not 
come full circle yet; on the contrary, ample room for improvement exists. 
ISO has several steps to take to align with the telos of the TBT Committee 
Decision but also with contemporary demands relating to global governance 
institutions. 
The US—Tuna II ruling can potentially herald a new era of international 
co-operation in international standard-setting based on solid grounds relating 
to due process, consultation, reasoned regulatory-making, inclusion, and 
technical excellence, particularly in light of the Appellate Body’s findings. 
At the same time, US—Tuna II was confined to a discussion of practices and 
institutional structures of a regional SSB, whereas it discussed shortly only 
 
 191.  See also Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by 
Judiciary, 27:1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 56 (2016). 
 192.  Only a few WTO Panel Reports have touched upon specific ISO standards. See, e.g., Panel 
Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS135/R (Sep. 18, 2000). 
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one of the six principles identified in the TBT Committee Decision. Thus, 
nothing would prejudge the outcome of a dispute in which an ISO standard 
would be at issue. 
This article, however, argued that the WTO adjudicating bodies will be 
no less willing to critically review the ISO standard-setting processes. This 
is also in line with a more critical view of international standard-setting, this 
time by the multilateral trading regime qua a parallel horizontal system. 
Evidence about insufficiently inclusive and open procedures throws shade 
against ISSBs and the ISO is no exception. Current discussions in NAMA 
negotiations only exemplify this discontent. And, while the present stalemate 
in the WTO negotiations may lead some to argue against the relevance of the 
views expressed within the WTO, it is submitted that essentially similar 
views are to be found in the negotiating texts of preferential trade 
agreements, so-called “mega-regionals” such as the TTIP193 or the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).194 
Such a critical view of international standardization activities is a 
welcome development if it leads to an era of more representative 
international standards. It is also indicative of a broader trend by public 
authorities to guarantee the importance of due process rights of all 
stakeholders in standard-setting activities.195 However, it is argued that a new 
conceptual framework is needed to inform the development of international 
standards in ISSBs. This new framework will inevitably build on the TBT 
Committee Decision, but shall also include other criteria relating to 
sustainability196 and inter-institutional sensitivity as well as cooperation with 
relevant international organizations and NGOs. Depending on the subject-
matter (for instance, to ensure that a given standard also is in line with 
 
 193.  See the EU’s textual proposal for a chapter on technical barriers to trade, Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership art. 6:3 (made public on January 7, 2015).  
 194.  The TPP text is even more explicit than the EU’s proposal under the TTIP, calling for the use 
of the TBT Committee Decision regarding international standards. See final text of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, Chapter 8 (Technical Barriers to Trade), art. 8.5. Despite the US withdrawal from the deal, 
the remaining TPP members will soon meet to see the prospects for implementing the deal among them.  
 195.  Failure to protect such rights within SSBs may lead to anti-competitive behavior. See, 
Communication from the European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, [2011] O.J. 
C 11/01, paras 280ff; US National Cooperative and Production Act (NCRPA), 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8). 
Early on, the US Supreme Court underlined the importance of procedural safeguards within SSBs. See 
Allied Tube v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 500, 501 (1988). 
 196.  ISO has recently published guidelines addressing sustainability in standards development. The 
guidelines are intended to encourage the examination of issues relating to sustainability during all stages of 
standards development within ISO. Importantly, the guidelines provide that the lack of considering 
sustainability issues in the development of a given standard can validly justify the revision of that standard 
and call for the involvement of knowledgeable experts in such a revision: See ISO Guide 82:2014. 
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pertinent labor or human rights), consumers and trade unions shall also be 
involved. 
Indeed, from a normative point of view, for a standard to be regarded as 
a genuinely international standard, additional, but at the same time more 
concrete, criteria would need to be developed. ISO seems to be laser focused 
on output legitimacy, which is a fairly appealing approach for an organization 
dealing with technical standards. However, input legitimacy (allowing 
interested parties to be heard at an early stage in the process), early notification 
procedures, and appropriate mechanisms for review that are easy to understand 
and use should be inextricably associated with the functioning of any 
organization that aspires to be a meta-regulator of technical matters at the 
international level. At the post-adoption stage, systematic impact assessment 
should be in place, allowing any ISO member to raise the need for revision. 
Additionally, in line with the dual character of ISO’s mission (that is, 
technical and political), scientific rigor, relevance, and technical excellence 
cannot be left outside any analysis as to the international character of a given 
standard. Furthermore, ISO has yet to make decisive steps towards more 
openness vis-à-vis the public. Information on standard-setting processes and 
on disciplinary cases or appeals is not readily available. This undue secrecy 
may harm the public image of ISO. Interestingly, even non-technical 
information produced by ISO such as guides or recommendations of a non-
technical nature are only available with a fee. 
To be sure, ISO’s business model, which is based on copyright protection 
and charging a fee for full access to the text of a standard, has been criticized 
because its application to standards referenced in legislation defies any notion 
of public openness and transparency.197 However, ISO could soften some of 
this criticism by offering access to non-technical documents such as guides or 
recommendations, all the more because many of them are made available by 
national SSBs.198 
 
 197.  In a recent case that discussed the question of copyright for model building codes incorporated 
in legislation, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit drew a line vis-à-vis standards created by 
SSBs suggesting that the latter are not created for the sole purpose of being used in binding legislation. 
Rather,  the relevant public authorities later decide to refer to such standards in their legislation, i.e. 
incorporate them by reference. The Court seemed to favor the existence of copyright protection in such 
cases although it denied such protection to the model codes at issue which were created with the sole 
purpose of becoming part of legislation, which then should exclude their copyrightability. See Veeck v 
Southern Building Code Congress Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 804−05 (5th Cir. 2002)(en banc).  
 198.  In the EU, the issue of access to the text of standards referenced in EU legislation (so-called 
‘harmonized standards’) is at the epicentre of the reform of the EU standardization processes also due to 
jurisprudential developments. In the recent Elliott case, the CJEU found that EU harmonized standards 
form part of EU law, opening the door for judicial action against the substantive content of standards but 
also against any denial by SSBs of access to these documents. See Case C-613/14, James Elliott Constr. 
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Finally, ISO also has an educational mission to accomplish that has often 
been neglected. The scratch line is not the same for all ISO members and this 
shows already in the distribution of technical work within ISO. Only by 
reducing the knowledge gap between ISO members can one hope for the 
creation of standards that largely reflect global preferences. This is a matter of 
political will and heavy investment: DEVCO regularly raises funding in ISO 
meetings but urges the most sophisticated members to increase their efforts 
and ensuing investment. It is a matter of fairness, but also a strategic matter for 
ISO: what would happen if the newly emerging economies which start having 
significant monopsony power experiment with the creation of their own 
standards that diverge from ISO standards, based on arguments of effective 
exclusion within ISO? This could have undesirable consequences for all ISO 
members and everyday business and trade. Further research on the functioning 
of ISSBs would be necessary to shed light on best practices and policies as 
well as procedural deficiencies that perpetuate an unbalanced standard-setting 
landscape at the international level. 
 
 
Ltd. V. Irish Asphalt Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2016:821, paras. 38−43 (2016); see also, Case C-630/16, Anstar, 
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